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Country Institutional Differences  
 
 
Abstract 
 
Using an international sample of firms from 31 countries, we study the relation between auditor 
quality and corporate tax aggressiveness. Using an indicator variable for tax aggressiveness when the 
firm’s corporate tax avoidance measure is within the top quintile of each country-industry 
combination, we find strong evidence that auditor quality is negatively associated with the likelihood 
of tax aggressiveness, even after controlling for other institutional determinants such as home-country 
tax system characteristics. We also find that the negative relation between auditor quality and the 
likelihood of tax aggressiveness is more pronounced in countries where investor protection is 
stronger, auditor litigation risk is higher, the audit environment is better, and capital market pressure 
is higher.  
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Audit Environment; Capital Market Pressure. 
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1. Introduction 
We examine the relation between auditor quality and corporate tax aggressiveness for a sample of 
firms from 31 countries.1 Prior research examining the determinants of corporate tax aggressiveness 
is primarily conducted in the U.S., where all firms operate under the same tax system, financial 
accounting standards, and institutional regimes.2 A notable exception is Atwood et al. (2012), who 
document that home-country tax system characteristics—required book-tax conformity, worldwide 
versus territorial approach, and strength of tax enforcement—reduce corporate tax avoidance. Our 
study complements Atwood et al. (2012) by examining whether auditor quality is also related to tax 
aggressiveness across countries. To our knowledge, none of the prior studies has specifically 
considered the role of auditor quality in corporate tax aggressiveness in an international setting. 
Additionally, we also consider whether differences in country-level institutional characteristics 
systematically affect the relation between auditor quality and corporate tax aggressiveness.  
In this study, we use an international setting to study the relation between auditor quality and 
corporate tax aggressiveness for three important reasons. First, tax aggressiveness is a world-wide 
phenomenon that has attracted increased attention. The media has recently reported many incidences 
of corporate tax aggressiveness by multinational firms.3 This focus on corporate tax aggressiveness is 
not confined only to developed economies, but is also prevalent in emerging economies around the 
                                                            
1 In this paper, we follow Hanlon and Heitzman (2010) and define tax avoidance broadly as the reduction in explicit taxes 
paid. Hanlon and Heitzman (2010) state that “if tax avoidance represents a continuum of tax planning strategies where 
something like municipal bond investments are at one end (lower explicit tax, perfectly legal), then terms such as 
“noncompliance,” “evasion,” “aggressiveness,” and “sheltering” would be closer to the other end of the continuum. 
Therefore, we define tax aggressiveness as tax planning strategies at the more aggressive end of the tax avoidance 
spectrum that are more likely to push the envelope of tax law, and to include the more aggressive tax-related activities that 
auditors presumably are more concerned about in their audits. 
2 See Hanlon and Heitzman (2010) for a review of the tax avoidance literature. 
3 These incidences include but are not limited to editorials in leading news outlets such as Bloomberg’s “The Great 
Corporate Tax Dodge,” the New York Times’ “But Nobody Pays That,” The Times’ “Secrets of Tax Avoiders,” and the 
Guardian’s “Tax Gap.”   
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world.4 However, there is scant research on the determinants on tax aggressiveness in an international 
setting (e.g., Atwood et al. 2012). Second, prior evidence on the role of the auditor in corporate tax 
aggressiveness focuses primarily on U.S. firms (e.g., Donohoe and Knechel 2014; Klassen et al. 
2015) and prior studies (e.g., McGuire et al. 2012) mainly focus on how auditors influence tax 
aggressiveness in the U.S. through the provision of auditor-provided tax services (APTS). However, 
there is little evidence on how auditor quality relates to tax aggressiveness internationally. One reason 
for this gap in the literature is that information on APTS is not available for many countries. Hence, 
rather than using APTS as a surrogate for auditor quality, we use Big N auditors to proxy for auditor 
quality because prior studies indicate that Big N auditors are associated with higher audit quality 
around the world (e.g., Choi and Wong 2007; Choi et al. 2008; Francis and Wang 2008; 
Kanagaretnam et al. 2010). Moreover, the results from the U.S. studies may not be generalizable to 
non-U.S. settings because the exposure to litigation risk of Big N auditors and the proportion of 
clients audited by Big N auditors in non-U.S. countries are much lower than in the U.S. Third, an 
advantage of examining tax aggressiveness in an international context is that the extent of auditors’ 
influence on tax aggressiveness likely depends on each country’s institutional environment and it is 
ex-ante unclear whether Big N auditors play a bigger or a smaller role in countries with stronger 
institutions compared to countries with weaker institutions. Our study attempts to shed some light on 
these issues. 
The primary role of auditors is to express an opinion on whether the financial statements and 
related disclosures present fairly, in all material respects, the client firm’s financial condition in 
conformity with generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP). Part of the audit engagement 
includes evaluating the validity and reasonableness of the recognition and disclosure of tax-related 
                                                            
4 For example, a recent report by Confederation of Indian Industry (CII) and global services firm Ernst & Young (EY) 
indicates that countries like India and China are looking at tax base erosion, which is a major area of concern. 
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items in the financial statements, and thus auditors may indirectly influence tax aggressiveness. 
Aggressive tax planning by clients likely increases the litigation risk faced by auditors because 
shareholders often attempt to hold auditors responsible for tax-related deficiencies in the financial 
statements (Donohoe and Knechel 2014). In the event that the firm is prosecuted by the tax authority 
for being tax non-compliant, the auditor could be implicated and be accused of failure to ensure 
disclosure of adequate tax reserves. In addition, if tax aggressive transactions are challenged by the 
tax authority, a substantial tax claim and related interest and penalties can lead to the client facing 
financial difficulties and having to restate financial reports, both of which are closely related to 
auditors’ litigation risk and reputational penalty (Stice 1991; Hennes et al. 2014). Furthermore, tax 
aggressive behavior calls into question the integrity and risk profile of management (e.g., Hanlon et 
al. 2012, footnote 11), casting doubt on the quality of other compliance activities and the overall 
control environment, thus further heightening the litigation and reputational risks of the auditor.5 
Hence auditors are likely to impose a stricter reporting standard on aggressive tax planning activities, 
which will in turn indirectly influence the level of tax aggressiveness of clients.  
This study empirically investigates the ambiguous relation between Big N auditors and tax 
aggressiveness. On the one hand, Big N auditors are likely to be negatively associated with firms’ tax 
aggressiveness because of litigation exposure and reputational concerns (Watts and Zimmerman 1983; 
Palmrose 1988; Shu 2000). Loss of reputation, as Arthur Andersen learned the hard way, could put a 
Big N auditor out of business (Huang and Li 2009). Litigation risk also motivates Big N auditors to 
remain vigilant and independent. Hindo (2003) reports that Deloitte and Touche, Ernst and Young, 
and PricewaterhouseCoopers resigned from more than 1,200 clients following the Enron-Andersen 
scandal in order to reduce the risk of litigation. On the other hand, prior studies also show that tax 
                                                            
5 There is also a potential financial reporting benefit from being tax aggressive because a lower tax expense results in 
higher post-tax earnings. A high quality audit can reduce this benefit by ensuring that the tax expense is not understated. 
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aggressiveness does not necessarily increase audit risk or tarnish auditor reputation. For example, 
Lennox et al. (2013) find that clients with greater tax aggressiveness are less likely to commit 
accounting frauds, presumably because tax aggressiveness could lead to greater IRS scrutiny of the 
accounting transactions, and therefore clients are less likely to manipulate earnings aggressively at 
the same time. Gallemore et al. (2014) document that firms and their top executives do not seem to 
bear reputational costs from aggressive tax sheltering activities. They also report no evidence of 
increased auditor turnover in the three years following tax shelter revelation. These two studies 
suggest that tax aggressiveness does not have a direct bearing on audit risk and reputation. Given the 
conflicting findings of prior research, the association between Big N auditors and tax aggressiveness 
is ultimately an empirical question. 
The effect of Big N auditors on tax aggressiveness may not be uniform across countries due to 
the differences in country-level institutional features. In additional cross-sectional analyses, we 
therefore consider several country-level institutional characteristics, including investor protection, 
auditor litigation risk, audit environment, and stock market pressure, that may systematically affect 
the relation between auditor quality and corporate tax aggressiveness. There are competing views on 
how institutional features such as investor protection may affect the relation between auditor quality 
and tax aggressiveness. One view is that a high quality auditor may serve as an alternative 
governance mechanism when legal enforcement and investor protection are weak (Choi and Wong 
2007). The alternate view contends that, as investor protection becomes stronger, the likelihood of 
detecting client misreporting increases and litigation losses increase. Thus, auditors have stronger 
incentives to enforce higher financial reporting quality, which will indirectly dampen tax 
aggressiveness when investor protection is strong (Francis and Wang 2008). Because of the 
competing views on the role of institutions, we empirically test how investor protection, auditor 
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litigation risk, and audit environment affect the relation between Big N auditors and tax 
aggressiveness. In addition, prior research suggests that firms manage earnings to meet or beat the 
market expectations when faced with strong capital market pressure (Teoh et al. 1998; Bartov et al. 
2002; Graham et al. 2005). Hence, we also investigate how stock market pressure influences the 
relation between Big N auditors and tax aggressiveness. 
We examine the relation between auditor quality and tax aggressiveness using a large non-U.S. 
sample of 41,958 firm-year observations across 31 countries spanning the years 1995 to 2007. 
Following prior studies, we use an indicator variable for Big N membership to proxy for auditor 
quality (e.g., Teoh and Wong 1993; Becker et al. 1998; Fan and Wong 2005; Choi and Wong 2007; 
Behn et al. 2008). We follow Atwood et al. (2012) and measure tax avoidance as the difference 
between the firm’s “unmanaged tax amount” (the home-country statutory corporate tax rate times 
pre-tax earnings before exceptional items) and its “managed tax amount” (current taxes paid). This 
difference reflects the extent to which managers pursue strategies to reduce taxes paid. To capture tax 
aggressiveness, we use an indicator variable that equals one if the firm’s corporate tax avoidance 
measure is within the top quintile of each country-industry combination, and zero otherwise. This 
measure attempts to capture the aggressive tax-related activities that auditors presumably are 
concerned about in their audits and thus is more closely related to our research question.6  
Based on logistic estimation, we find that Big N auditors are associated with a lower 
likelihood of corporate tax aggressiveness, after controlling for factors that have been shown to affect 
tax aggressiveness in an international setting (e.g., Atwood et al. 2012). We also find that the 
                                                            
6 Measures of tax aggressiveness used in the extant literature include DTAX (Frank et al. 2009), tax shelter prediction 
score (Wilson 2009), and unrecognized tax benefit (UTB) prediction score (Rego and Wilson 2012). However, because 
we use an international sample of firms from Compustat Global, many of the variables required to compute these 
measures of tax aggressiveness are either not available or not applicable in settings outside the U.S. (e.g., tax shelter 
prediction score, and UTB prediction score). If our measure merely picks up clients’ non-risky tax planning activities 
which auditors are presumably less concerned about, we should observe no association between auditor quality and tax 
aggressiveness. However, we find a strong negative association which is consistent with our hypothesis.   
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negative association between Big N auditors and the likelihood of tax aggressiveness is more 
pronounced when investor protection is stronger, when the audit environment is better, when auditors 
are exposed to higher litigation risk, and when capital market pressure on firms is stronger. We also 
find that firms audited by industry specialist auditors exhibit a lower likelihood of tax aggressiveness 
and that Big N auditors are associated with a lower likelihood of  tax aggressiveness in the post-2002 
period after the demise of Arthur Andersen. Our results are robust to a number of sensitivity tests, 
including using two alternate measures of tax aggressiveness and two alternate proxies for auditor 
quality, examining firms that switch auditors during the sample period, and excluding firms from the 
U.K., which comprise the largest proportion of our sample. 
Our study makes several important contributions to the literature. First, it adds to the audit 
literature on the effects of Big N auditors. This literature suggests that Big N auditors provide a 
valuable service by enhancing financial reporting quality around the world. We contribute to this 
research by documenting that Big N auditors are associated with a lower likelihood of tax 
aggressiveness across countries, and this result holds after controlling for the various components of 
accruals that proxy for earnings management. Second, we contribute to prior research by 
documenting that the association between auditor quality and the likelihood of tax aggressiveness 
varies with different characteristics of the institutional environment. This evidence is important as 
most of the research on tax aggressiveness is conducted primarily in the U.S.,  where all firms operate 
under the same institutional setting. We exploit the cross-country differences in institutional 
structures to examine how these institutional characteristics moderate the relation between auditor 
quality and the likelihood of tax aggressiveness, which cannot be examined in a single country setting 
such as the U.S. Third, we contribute to the literature that investigates cross-country determinants of 
tax aggressiveness. Atwood et al. (2012) find that tax aggressiveness across countries is associated 
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with country-level tax system characteristics, i.e., required book-tax conformity, worldwide versus 
territorial approach, and perceived strength of tax enforcement. We add to their findings by showing 
that auditor quality is also associated with the likelihood of tax aggressiveness, after explicitly 
controlling for the tax system characteristics in a country. Fourth, our study should be of interest to 
tax policymakers concerned about declining corporate tax revenues and the increasing gap between 
reported earnings and taxable income. Policymakers suggest that formal actions such as tightening 
tax loopholes and increasing tax enforcement are likely to result in lower tax avoidance (Shulman 
2009; DOT 2011; Gravelle 2011; Hufbauer 2011; Keener 2011; Zrust 2011). Our findings suggest 
that firms employing high quality auditors exhibit a lower likelihood of tax aggressiveness; however, 
this relation varies with a country’s institutional environment. 
Our study is subject to several limitations. First, our cross-country firm-level measure of tax 
aggressiveness is based on a simple difference between the home-country statutory tax rate and the 
cash effective tax rate. To the extent that this measure is influenced by the firm’s foreign operations 
which are taxed at a different statutory tax rate, it will be noisy. However, this noise is likely to bias 
against finding the documented results. Second, because firms’ incentive to be tax aggressive is likely 
to be influenced by home-country norms, tax system characteristics, and other institutional factors, 
our findings could be affected by the extent to which these factors are correlated with our test variable 
and not controlled for in our empirical estimation. Third, because we cannot directly observe or 
identify the specific mechanisms through which auditor quality affects tax aggressiveness, we note 
that the reported relations between high quality auditors and tax aggressiveness across countries are 
observed associations, and may not result from underlying causal relations. For instance, due to data 
limitation, we are not able to observe whether high quality auditors influence tax aggressiveness 
through an external audit procedure solely and/or through the provision of APTS and thus, we are not 
8 
 
able to conclude how external auditors influence tax aggressiveness in our study. Future studies with 
access to finer data can take this step to further our understanding of the channels through which 
external auditors influence corporate tax aggressiveness. Finally, firms’ choice of external auditors is 
not exogenous. For instance, it is possible that firms seeking to be tax aggressive may choose a low 
quality auditor to avoid scrutiny by their external auditors, which is also consistent with our findings 
(reverse causality). Our results should be interpreted cautiously in light of these limitations. 
 The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In section two, we discuss related research on 
tax aggressiveness and develop our predictions on the relation between auditor quality and corporate 
tax aggressiveness, and how that relation may vary with institutional characteristics. We describe the 
measures of our main variables of interest and the research design in section three. We discuss the 
main results in section four and the results of additional analyses and robustness checks in section 
five. We provide our conclusions in section six. 
 
2. Research Background and Hypotheses 
2.1 Prior Research on Tax Avoidance and Tax Aggressiveness 
Using predominantly U.S. data, prior research has identified several firm characteristics that are 
associated with tax avoidance across firms. These characteristics include firm size, profitability, 
leverage, capital intensity, and foreign operations (Stickney and McGee 1982; Zimmerman 1983; 
Porcano 1986; Shevlin and Porter 1992; Gupta and Newberry 1997; Rego 2003). More recent 
research reports that companies accused of tax sheltering are more profitable, report larger book-tax 
differences, have higher R&D spending and lower leverage, and operate subsidiaries in foreign tax 
havens (Graham and Tucker 2006; Wilson 2009; Lisowsky 2010). Further, firms’ ownership structure 
(family ownership and dual class share structure) and corporate social responsibility (CSR) efforts are 
related to tax avoidance behavior (Chen et al. 2010; Hoi et al. 2013; McGuire et al. 2014).  
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Prior studies primarily explore tax avoidance across firms within one country, mainly within 
the U.S. One notable exception is Atwood et al. (2012) who examine whether three home-country tax 
system characteristics – required book-tax conformity, worldwide versus territorial approach, and 
perceived strength of tax enforcement – are related to corporate tax avoidance. They find that, on 
average, a firm exhibits lower tax avoidance when required book-tax conformity is higher, a 
worldwide approach is used, and tax enforcement is perceived to be stronger. We extend this line of 
research by examining the relation between auditor quality and corporate tax aggressiveness in a 
cross-country setting. In our analysis, we explicitly control for the three tax system characteristics 
studied in Atwood et al. (2012). 
2.2 Auditors’ Role in Tax Aggressiveness 
The primary role of auditors is to express an opinion on whether the financial statements and related 
disclosures present fairly, in all material respects, the client firm’s financial condition in conformity 
with generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP). Because income taxes could amount to as 
much as one-half of a public firm’s net income, an auditor should always consider the amount as 
material to financial statements. Hence, auditors evaluate the validity of accrued taxes payable and 
tax contingent liabilities on the balance sheet, income tax expense on the income statement, and the 
related note disclosures to provide adequate assurance to the investing public about the 
appropriateness of these items and disclosures (Barrett 2004). Because any material information 
about questionable tax transactions tends to be hidden in these accounts and disclosures, auditors also 
have to assess whether their clients engage in potentially abusive tax transactions that can be 
challenged if uncovered by the tax authority. Auditors, if necessary, could require clients to reflect 
correctly the tax-related items on the financial statements, for example, by recording a contingency 
reserve or unrecognized tax benefit adjustment, hence increasing reported tax expense and reducing 
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the financial statement benefits of engaging in tax avoidance. By ensuring that book and taxable 
income are correctly reported in the financial statements, auditors indirectly reduce firms’ abilities 
and incentives to avoid tax because a large book-tax difference can be a potential red flag (Hanlon 
2005), which increases the probability of detection by the tax authorities. 
Auditors have incentives to influence clients’ aggressive tax activities for several reasons. 
First, firms that engage in aggressive tax behavior have a higher likelihood of misstatements and 
restatements because managers can use various accounts, such as valuation allowances, tax 
contingency reserves, and estimates of accrued taxes, to manage earnings (Dhaliwal et al. 2004; 
Frank and Rego 2006; Hanlon and Heitzman 2010; Gupta et al. 2015). Because a client’s aggressive 
financial reporting is positively associated with auditor litigation risk (Heninger 2001; Palmrose and 
Scholz 2004), tax aggressiveness can increase the litigation risk of the auditor when tax-related 
misstatements and restatements occur. 7  Second, recent studies show that news about a firm’s 
involvement in aggressive tax planning reduces stock price (Hanlon and Slemrod 2009) and increases 
stock price crash risk (Kim et al. 2011). The potential loss in shareholders’ wealth can also precipitate 
lawsuits against the firm and its auditor (Francis et al. 1994; Grundfest and Perino 1997). Hence, 
auditors who audit clients who are tax aggressive face higher engagement risk.  
Lastly, tax aggressive behavior calls into question the integrity and risk profile/appetite of 
management and exacerbates the agency problems between the firm and its stakeholders. Studies 
have shown that aggressive tax behavior is driven by “tone at the top” (Desai and Dharmapala 2006; 
Dyreng et al. 2010), and tax aggressiveness could indicate management’s attitude towards 
compliance with rules and regulations (Hanlon et al. 2012, footnote 11). A weak tone at the top and 
its effect on the control environment can increase the likelihood that the stakeholders might not be 
                                                            
7  In the U.S. setting, Donohoe and Knechel (2014, footnote 6) document various instances where companies and 
shareholders file lawsuits against auditors for tax-related deficiencies in the financial statements.  
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able to uncover potential financial misconduct within the firm. Self-serving managers also have 
incentives to use tax avoidance activities to mask rent-seeking behavior (Desai and Dharmapala 
2006), which again increases the risk faced by auditors. 
2.3 Big N Auditors, Auditor Quality, and Tax Aggressiveness 
Using economic theory, DeAngelo (1981) argues that auditor size is a proxy for auditor reputation 
and audit quality, and that Big N auditors with valuable reputations at stake have more incentive to 
ensure that their clients’ financial statements properly reflect the underlying transactions. Consistent 
with the notion that Big N auditors enhance the credibility of financial statements, prior studies 
document that Big N auditors are associated with higher financial reporting quality in public firms 
around the world (Khurana and Raman 2004; Choi et al. 2008; Francis and Wang 2008; 
Kanagaretnam et al. 2010). Besides reputational concerns, extant theory and evidence indicates that 
Big N auditors provide more implicit insurance coverage in the event of audit failure (Watts and 
Zimmerman 1986; Dye 1993; Mansi et al. 2004). In other words, Big N auditors with “deep pockets” 
have stronger incentives to lower the expected costs of litigation by supplying superior audits. 
Consistent with the “deep pockets” explanation, Khurana and Raman (2004) find that the audit 
quality differentiation between Big N and non-Big N auditors is positively affected by country-level 
litigation risk. Lys and Watts (1994) also find that lawsuits against auditors are more likely to occur 
for clients with income-increasing accruals. The results of these studies, coupled with the demise of 
Arthur Andersen, highlight the potential liability of auditors and the importance for auditors to 
mitigate the possibility of lawsuits against them. 
In summary, Big N auditors improve accounting transparency to avoid tarnishing their 
reputations and becoming entangled in costly litigation by better constraining managers from 
distorting reported earnings. Prior evidence suggests that tax aggressiveness may be associated with 
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aggressive financial reporting behavior as managers seek to report both higher book income and 
lower taxable income at the same time (Frank et al. 2009). Donohoe and Knechel (2014) argue that 
clients’ greater tax aggressiveness can expose an auditor to litigation, regulatory, and reputational 
costs, and hence, audit effort is a function of clients’ tax position. They find that auditors charge a 
higher fee premium to clients who are more tax aggressive, presumably to compensate for bearing 
higher risk. Klassen et al. (2015) find that tax returns prepared by auditors are associated with less 
aggressive tax positions. Taken together, these studies suggest that auditors most likely are concerned 
about the clients’ tax position as it inevitably affects the audit and engagement risks faced by auditors.  
Therefore, Big N auditors concerned about risky tax aggressive activities mitigate their exposure to 
litigation and reputation risks by ensuring appropriate tax reporting, which will in turn dampen the 
firms’ incentives to engage in tax aggressive activities. 
However, the association between auditor quality and risky tax aggressive activities may be 
ambiguous in light of prior studies. Using proprietary data from the IRS, Lisowsky (2010) finds that 
Big N auditors are positively associated with tax sheltering activities, as these auditors are viewed as 
promoters of tax services.  Similarly, McGuire et al. (2012) report that external audit firms providing 
both audit and tax services, that are either industry tax or overall specialists (both audit and tax), are 
associated with increased levels of tax aggressiveness for their clients. The evidence suggests that 
audit firms with tax or overall expertise employ their knowledge to devise tax avoidance strategies 
that benefit the firm rather than using their expertise to constrain firms’ tax planning opportunities. 
Erickson et al. (2004) find that firms with aggressive financial reporting are associated with lower tax 
aggressiveness. They attribute their evidence that fraud firms overpay their taxes to managers trying 
to avoid arousing suspicion from government agencies, including the SEC and the IRS, and outside 
investors. Lennox et al. (2013) also find that clients with greater tax aggressiveness are less likely to 
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commit accounting frauds, consistent with the notion that committing fraud reduces the benefit from 
undertaking aggressive tax positions and would be viewed as a red flag by the IRS. Gallemore et al. 
(2014) investigate whether firms and their top executives bear reputational costs from engaging in tax 
sheltering activities. They examine the reputational costs that prior research has shown firms and 
managers face in cases of alleged misconduct: increased CEO and CFO turnover, auditor turnover, 
lost sales, increased advertising costs, and decreased media reputation. In particular, they report no 
evidence of auditor turnover when clients are accused of engaging in tax sheltering activities. 
Collectively, the above studies suggest no direct relation between tax aggressiveness and audit risk or 
auditor reputation loss. Consequently, the association between Big N auditors and tax aggressiveness 
is ultimately an empirical question. Because of the ambiguity in the relation, we posit the following 
non-directional hypothesis stated in null form: 
H1:  Auditor quality is unrelated to a firm’s tax aggressiveness.  
2.4 Role of Institutions in the Relation between Auditor Quality and Tax Aggressiveness 
The relation between auditor quality and tax aggressiveness may not be uniform across different 
country-level institutional environments. We explore the interactions between auditor quality and 
these institutional features, and their joint effects on tax aggressiveness. We consider three country-
level institutional characteristics – investor protection, auditor litigation risk and audit environment, 
and the importance of capital market pressure.  
2.4.1 Investor Protection 
While the quality of institutions, such as the strength of investor protection, is likely to improve 
information quality in general, it is not obvious whether the benefits of having a high quality auditor 
matter more when investor protection is stronger. There are opposing views on how the behavior of 
Big N auditors differs across investor protection regimes. One view is that Big N auditors allow less 
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managerial discretion and press for more disclosure and transparency only when investor protection is 
strong. As investor protection becomes stronger, the likelihood of detecting client misreporting 
increases, litigation losses become larger, and Big N auditors have more reputational capital at risk.8 
Consistent with this idea, Francis and Wang (2008) find that Big N audits are associated with higher 
earnings quality as investor protection becomes stronger. Michas (2011) finds that earnings quality is 
higher in countries with better professional development for auditors but, again, only for Big N 
clients. Hossain et al. (2010) find that firms with better governance are more likely to employ Big N 
auditors, and this relation is more pronounced when the strength of legal enforcement is stronger. 
Collectively, these studies suggest that the benefits from employing high-quality auditors are greater 
when investor protection is stronger because both auditors and firms are subject to more severe legal 
punishments for opportunistic behavior. 
The opposing view is that firms in weaker investor protection regimes may demand high-
quality auditors to substitute for the weak governance. Consistent with this view, Choi and Wong 
(2007) find that firms with debt or equity issuances are more likely to hire Big N auditors when 
investor protection is weaker, suggesting that Big N auditors play a more important governance 
function in weak investor-protection countries. Furthermore, Fan and Wong (2005) find that East-
Asian companies with more agency conflicts are more likely to hire Big N auditors. Han et al. (2012) 
show that Big N audits are positively associated with disclosure transparency and that this association 
is stronger in code-law than in common-law countries.  
Because of the two competing views, we state the following non-directional hypothesis in null 
form:  
                                                            
8 Fan and Wong (2005) provide several reasons why audit quality is lower in weak investor protection regime. First, the 
institutional environment supports an opaque business environment which limits the effectiveness of the audit function. 
Second, external audit loses its value when auditor’s adverse opinion does not result in significant consequence in these 
countries where investor protection is weak. Third, the lack of audit expertise in these countries weakens the independent 
auditors’ monitoring role. 
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H2a: The relation between auditor quality and tax aggressiveness does not vary with the level 
of investor protection in the country. 
 
2.4.2 Auditor Litigation Risk and Audit Environment 
Auditor litigation risk likely affects auditors’ incentives and behavior, and litigation risk differs 
between countries (Wingate 1997; Khurana and Raman 2004). When litigation risk is high, Big N 
auditors are subject to greater exposure to civil lawsuits and regulatory sanctions for low quality work 
such as issuing a clean opinion on materially inaccurate financial statements (Guedhami and Pittman 
2006). Faced with higher litigation risk, Big N auditors will likely react by tightly constraining 
managers’ discretion over firms’ accounting policies and estimates, including aggressive tax planning. 
In contrast, non-Big N auditors with less reputation capital at stake and without the “deep pockets” of 
the Big N auditors have stronger incentives to accept, for example, aggressive tax planning to avoid 
dismissal by their clients. Hence Big N auditors may be associated with a lower likelihood of tax 
aggressiveness when litigation risk is higher, since litigation and regulatory forces discipline them to 
insist that managers refrain from distorting the financial statements through aggressive tax activities.  
The audit environment also affects auditors’ behavior in dealing with clients’ aggressive tax 
planning. Given the information asymmetry problems between firms’ managers and their capital 
providers (Jensen and Meckling 1976), external auditors are engaged to provide assurance about the 
quality of information provided by the managers. However, the extent to which auditors fulfill this 
role depends on their effectiveness. Brown et al. (2014) suggest that factors relating to audit licensing, 
training and oversight as well as levels of audit fees and litigation risk, will affect the skills and 
training of auditors and their incentives to carry out their role effectively. We predict that as the 
quality of the audit environment increases, the role of auditor quality is more pronounced in 
influencing tax aggressiveness.  
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However, the effect of auditor litigation risk and audit environment on the relation between 
auditor quality and tax aggressiveness is not obvious. For example, it is possible that Big N auditors 
influence aggressive tax activities regardless of the level of litigation risk. Prior studies (e.g., Weber 
et al. 2008; Skinner and Srinivasan 2012) find that auditors continue to provide high quality audits in 
countries, such as Germany and Japan, where litigation risk is virtually non-existent. Big N auditors 
are also likely to provide consistent audit quality around the world (Simunic and Stein 1987). These 
Big N audit firms have built global networks of national partnerships to allow their local offices to 
access global information, knowledge and experience. They attempt to develop and maintain a 
uniform global reputation and promote themselves as being single international firms that maintain a 
uniform level of audit quality across the world. Consequently, Big N auditors may similarly influence 
clients’ financial reporting, including aggressive tax planning, even when litigation risk is low or the 
audit environment is poor. Hence whether Big N auditors play a bigger role in high or low litigation 
risk and audit environments is an empirical question. Accordingly, we state the following non-
directional hypothesis in null form:  
H2b: The relation between auditor quality and tax aggressiveness does not vary with the level 
of auditor litigation risk and the quality of the audit environment in the country. 
 
2.4.3 Capital Market Pressure 
We also investigate how stock market development and capital market pressure influences the 
behavior of Big N auditors regarding tax aggressiveness. We expect Big N auditors to play a bigger 
role when the size of the capital market is larger. Firms in countries with larger capital markets have 
greater access to equity financing. Due to the greater information asymmetries between the firm and 
equity investors, firms may be more concerned about the quality of financial information to reduce 
information asymmetry between the investors and the firm. The sheer size of the capital market 
increases the pressure for firms to report favorable information to secure external financing. Prior 
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research shows that managers are likely to manage earnings when faced with strong capital market 
pressure. For example, Rangan (1998), Teoh et al. (1998), and Shivakumar (2000) show that firms 
manage earnings upward prior to equity issuance. The market also assigns a premium to firms that 
meet or beat analyst expectations (Bartov et al. 2002; Kasznik and McNichols 2002) and penalizes 
firms for missing expectations (Skinner and Sloan 2002). Survey evidence in Graham et al. (2005) 
points to capital market pressure as the primary reason why managers avoid missing expectations. We 
expect auditor quality to play a more important role when capital market pressure is stronger. Based 
on the above discussion, we state our final hypothesis as follows: 
H2c: The relation between auditor quality and tax aggressiveness is more pronounced when the 
level of capital market pressure in the country is higher. 
 
 
3. Research Design 
 
3.1 Measure of Tax Aggressiveness  
Following Hanlon and Heitzman (2010) and Atwood et al. (2012), we define tax avoidance broadly 
as the reduction in the explicit taxes paid.9 We measure tax avoidance as the difference between the 
tax on pre-tax income computed at the home-country statutory corporate tax rate and the taxes 
actually paid, expressed as a percentage of pre-tax income. We focus on cash taxes paid because it is 
less sensitive to home-country financial accounting standards than other tax avoidance measures such 
as effective tax rates, where tax expense recognized is influenced by local GAAP. In particular, our 
measure of tax avoidance (TAXAVOID) for firm i in year t is computed as follows: 
ܶܣܺܣܸܱܫܦ௜௧ ൌ ሾ
∑ ሺܲܶܧܤܺ ൈ ߬ሻ௜௧ െ ∑ ܥܶ ௜ܲ௧ሿ௧௧ିଶ௧௧ିଶ
∑ ܲܶܧܤ ௜ܺ௧௧௧ିଶ 																																																																																																		ሺ1ሻ                                                             
9 As in Dyreng et al. (2008) and Atwood et al. (2012), this measure of tax avoidance does not necessarily imply that firms 
are engaging in improper or illegal behavior, and this measure is not able to differentiate between tax avoiding activities 
that would be considered prudent tax planning versus activities that would be considered abusive tax sheltering. As noted 
by Atwood et al. (2012), while it may be more interesting to examine specific actions taken to avoid tax (e.g., the strategic 
location of subsidiaries in foreign countries, the amount of income shifted, investments in tax shelters, etc.), specific 
actions are usually not observable empirically in the international setting and thus limiting our choice of empirical 
measure of tax avoidance.  
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where PTEBX refers to pre-tax earnings before exceptional items,  refers to home-country statutory 
corporate tax rate, and CTP refers to current taxes paid. We compute this measure using a three-year 
window because this time period is adequate to reduce the effects of items that reverse in just one 
year.10 Following Atwood et al. (2012), we require the denominator in (1) to be positive; hence, our 
sample only includes firms that are profitable in the three-year window. This measure of tax 
avoidance indicates the amount of taxes that the firm is able to avoid relative to the amount of taxes it 
is supposed to pay based on the home-country statutory tax rate (“unmanaged tax amount”), and the 
extent of tax avoidance is increasing in this measure. Because we intend to capture the more 
aggressive tax avoidance activities that auditors presumably care more about in the course of their 
audit, we use the indicator variable TAXAGGR, which equals one if TAXAVOID is in the top quintile 
in each country-industry combination, and zero otherwise to proxy for tax aggressiveness.  
3.2 Measure of Auditor quality 
Auditors provide assurance of the accounting information supplied to outside investors. The literature 
has consistently provided evidence that Big N auditors are quality differentiated from non–Big N 
auditors in the U.S. and around the world. 11  Big N auditors are better able to detect material 
misstatements in financial statements and more willing to report what they find than are non-Big N 
auditors. Big N auditors are associated with higher expertise because they not only have more 
                                                            
10 We do not compute this measure over longer windows, such as five-year or ten-year windows (e.g., Dyreng et al. 2008), 
to avoid limiting our sample size. As noted by Dyreng et al. (2008), tax avoidance measures that are estimated over 
shorter periods of time may be imperfect because they include payments to (and refunds from) the tax authorities upon 
settling of tax disputes that arose years ago. Tax avoidance measures that are estimated over longer periods mitigate this 
concern because the income to which these taxes relate will more likely be included in the same ratio as the taxes. As a 
sensitivity check, we also use a longer horizon of five years to compute tax avoidance, and find qualitatively unchanged 
results. 
11 Firth (1985), Simon et al. (1986), Chung and Lindsay (1988), Simon et al. (1992), Craswell et al. (1995), and DeFond, 
et al. (2000) document the existence of a Big N brand-name fee premium in New Zealand, India, Canada, Singapore, 
Australia, and Hong Kong, hence providing support to the view that Big N auditors are quality differentiated from non-
Big N auditors in these countries. Some recent cross-country research implies that Big N auditors’ stronger incentives to 
identify material accounting misstatements and to resist client pressure to waive their correction generalizes outside the 
U.S. (Fan and Wong 2005; Choi and Wong 2007). In contrast, Vander Bauwhede and Willekens (2004) find no audit-
quality differentiation between Big N and non-Big N auditors in a sample of private firms in Belgium, which may be 
attributable to the specific audit environment in Belgium. 
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resources but also devote more resources to specialized staff training, peer reviews, and investment in 
information technology than non-Big N auditors (Craswell et al. 1995). Similarly, Big N auditors are 
more independent because they have higher reputation capital at stake relative to non-Big N auditors. 
Following prior studies (Teoh and Wong 1993; Becker et al. 1998; Fan and Wong 2005; Choi and 
Wong 2007), we use an indicator variable for Big N/non–Big N membership to proxy for auditor 
quality.12 
3.3 Empirical Models – Main Analyses 
To test H1, we estimate the following pooled cross-sectional logistic regression: 
TAXAGGRit = α + βBIGNit + ψCONTROLSit + YEAR_FE + IND_FE + εit                                      (2) 
where TAXAGGR is an indicator variable that equals one if TAXAVOID is in the top quintile in each 
country-industry combination, and zero otherwise, BIGN is the measure of auditor quality, and 
CONTROLS is a vector of firm-level and country-level controls, and YEAR_FE and IND_FE are time 
and industry indicators, respectively.13 Because we conduct our estimation on a pooled sample, we 
cluster the standard errors by firm and include time and industry fixed-effects in our regressions 
(Petersen 2009).14 The Appendix includes the detailed definitions of all the variables. 
                                                            
12 While a large body of audit literature generally finds that Big N auditors are associated with higher audit quality as 
compared to non-Big N auditors even after controlling for self-selection, Lawrence et al. (2011) report that the Big N 
quality differentiation disappears after controlling for self-section using a Propensity Score Matching (PSM) research 
design. DeFond et al. (2014) investigate whether Lawrence et al.’s (2011) finding is sensitive to research design choices 
inherent in PSM, and find that in a large majority of design choices (94 to 100 percent of the sample), Big N auditors 
provide higher audit quality than non-Big N auditors. DeFond et al. (2014) also utilize an alternative matching procedure 
and find evidence consistent with higher Big N audit quality. 
13 Industries are defined as in the classification in Frankel et al. (2002), which is based on the following SIC codes: 
agriculture (0100–0999), mining and construction (1000–1999, excluding 1300–1399), food (2000–2111), textiles and 
printing/publishing (2200–2799), chemicals (2800–2824, 2840–2899), pharmaceuticals (2830–2836), extractive (2900–
2999, 1300–1399), durable manufacturers (3000–3999, excluding 3570–3579 and 3670–3679), transportation (4000–
4899), utilities (4900–4999), retail (5000–5999), services (7000–8999, excluding 7370–7379) and computers (3570–3579, 
3670–3679, 7370–7379). 
14 Petersen (2009) suggests that in the presence of cross-sectional and time-series dependence, one dependence effect can 
be addressed parametrically (e.g., including time indicators for cross-sectional dependence) and then standard errors 
clustered on the other dependence effect (e.g., clustering by firms for time-series dependence) can be estimated. As we 
have more firm than year observations, we use year indicators and cluster by firm because a larger number of clusters lead 
to standard errors that are less biased. 
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 We select CONTROLS that are factors documented by prior literature to be associated with 
tax avoidance (e.g., Atwood et al. 2012). The first set of controls includes country-level variables 
(WW, BTAXC, TAXRATE, TAXENF, PCTEQ, and EARNVOL). We control for various characteristics 
of the country’s tax system, including 1) whether the country’s tax system follows a worldwide or a 
territorial approach (WW), 2) required book-tax conformity in the country (BTAXC), 3) country’s 
statutory tax rate (TAXRATE),15 and 4) strength of tax enforcement in the country (TAXENF), because 
Atwood et al. (2012) find that these tax system characteristics are associated with firms’ incentives to 
avoid taxes.16 We include the country average of managers’ variable pay as a percentage of total 
compensation (PCTEQ), because prior literature suggests that managerial compensation incentives 
affect tax aggressiveness (Desai and Dharmapala 2006; Armstrong et al. 2012; Atwood et al. 2012; 
Rego and Wilson 2012).17 We also include earnings volatility (EARNVOL) as a control because 
Atwood et al. (2010) report that BTAXC is positively correlated with the cross-sectional variance in 
pre-tax income, and hence it is important to include this variable to ensure that the effect of BTAXC 
on tax aggressiveness is not overstated due to cross-country differences in earnings volatility. We 
control for economic development measured by the log of real GDP per capita (LGDP) and a time 
trend variable (TREND) to capture the fact that statutory tax rates have been declining over time and 
may affect corporate tax aggressiveness over time.  
                                                            
15 We include the statutory tax rate as a control variable following Atwood et al. (2012), who highlight that because the 
measure of tax avoidance includes the statutory tax rate in its computation, it is important to control for the statutory tax 
rate to avoid a potential mechanical relation. 
16 We hand-collect each country’s annual statutory corporate tax rate and whether the tax system is worldwide or 
territorial from various sources such as Ernst and Young’s Worldwide Corporate Tax Guide, KPMG’s Corporate and 
Indirect Tax Rate Survey, PwC’s Worldwide Tax Summaries, PwC’s “Evolution of Territorial Tax Systems in the 
OECD” report, etc. 
17 Atwood et al. (2012) use the country average of managers’ variable pay as a percentage of management compensation 
from Towers Perrin (2005), which reports the pay components of CEOs across 26 countries. We do not have access to 
data from the Towers Perrin’s report. Instead, we obtain equity–based compensation data from Bryan et al. (2010) who 
provide average equity-based compensation for 43 countries. The use of this variable also explains why our sample 
includes 32 countries, whereas Atwood et al. (2012)’s sample includes only 22 countries. 
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 The second set of controls includes firm-level variables that are documented to be associated 
with tax avoidance. We control for firm performance using pre-tax return on assets (PROA) because 
profitable firms have greater incentives to be tax aggressive. We control for firm size (SIZE) because 
larger firms have more resources and ability to avoid taxes. On the other hand, profitable and larger 
firms may avoid paying lower taxes to mitigate additional political scrutiny on paying their fair share 
of taxes. We control for tax planning opportunities, such as research and development tax credits and 
interest deductibility on debt, using research and development intensity (R&D) and leverage (LEV). 
We control for sales growth (GROWTH) because firms with higher sales growth enjoy greater 
marginal benefits from tax planning and hence have greater incentives to avoid taxes (Edwards et al. 
2012). We control for firms with multinational operations (MULTI) because operations in different 
countries may present opportunities to avoid taxes through income shifting. Lastly, we control for 
various components of accruals (WC, NCO and FIN) based on the reliability classification 
developed by Richardson et al. (2005) and used in Atwood et al. (2012). It is important to control for 
accruals so that we are able to determine whether auditor quality relates to tax aggressiveness solely 
through accruals or also through other non-accrual-related tax-planning strategies, such as the use of 
tax havens, tax shelters, income shifting, cost sharing arrangements, etc.  
3.4 Empirical Models – Cross-sectional Analyses 
To test H2, we modify equation (2) to include the conditioning variable (Conditioning_VAR) and its 
interaction with BIGN, and we estimate the following pooled cross-sectional logistic regression:18 
                                                            
18 Ai and Norton (2003) argue that the interaction effect in a non-linear model, such as the logistic specification of 
equation (3), cannot be evaluated and interpreted simply by looking at the sign, magnitude, and statistical significance of 
the coefficient on the interaction term. Rather, interpreting the interaction effect requires computation of modified 
statistics based on cross-derivatives or cross-differences. However, Greene (2010) contends that the modified statistics 
proposed by Ai and Norton (2003) do not provide meaningful interpretations and statistical inferences. In addition, 
Kolasinski and Siegel (2011) draw on the extant statistics literature (e.g., Le 1998) and show that the interaction 
coefficient and test statistic in a standard logistic specification are appropriate for research dealing with non-extreme 
probabilities and are economically meaningful. Therefore, we continue to estimate and interpret the interaction effects in 
equation (3). 
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TAXAGGRit = α + βBIGNit + ηBIGNit × Conditioning_VAR + γConditioning_VAR  
      + ψCONTROLSit + YEAR_FE + IND_FE + εit                                        (3) 
In H2a, we examine the effect of investor protection on the relation between auditor quality 
and corporate tax aggressiveness. We use three different measures of investor protection to 
triangulate our results. The first measure is an indicator variable that equals one if the country is a 
common law country, and zero otherwise (COMMON). Prior literature suggests that strict and well-
enforced laws to protect minority investors are more prevalent in countries with common law 
traditions than in countries with code law traditions (e.g., Haw et al. 2004), which implies that the 
strength of investor protection is stronger in common law countries. The second measure is the legal 
enforcement index (LAWE) reported in La Porta et al. (1998), measured as the mean score of the 
following three legal enforcement variables: efficiency of the judicial system, rule of law, and 
corruption. These three variables range from zero to ten, with higher scores indicating greater law 
enforcement. The strength of investor protection is stronger when the quality of enforcement is 
higher. The third measure is the anti-self-dealing index (ANTIDEAL), based on Djankov et al. (2008). 
This measure is designed to capture the strength of minority shareholder protection against self-
dealing by the controlling shareholder, and focuses on private enforcement mechanisms such as 
disclosure, approval, and litigation, that govern a specific self-dealing transaction. The strength of 
investor protection is stronger when anti-self-dealing mechanisms are in place.  
 In H2b, we focus on auditor litigation risk and the audit environment. We use two indicators 
to assess the litigation risk of auditors across countries. The first is the liability standard index 
(BURDEN) from La Porta et al. (2006), which equals the arithmetic mean of (1) liability standard for 
the issuer and its directors, (2) liability standard for the distributor, and (3) liability standard for the 
accountant. The index is increasing in litigation risk exposure. The second index is the litigation 
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index (LITIG) reported in Wingate (1997) and used in Choi and Wong (2007) and Choi et al. (2008) 
as a proxy for auditor litigation risk. This index is developed by an international insurance 
underwriter for one of the Big N audit firms and represents the “risk of doing business as an auditor” 
in a particular country, with higher values indicating higher litigation risk exposure. Next, we use the 
audit environment index (AUDENV) reported by Brown et al. (2014) to capture differences between 
countries in relation to the institutional setting for the auditing of financial statements. Brown et al. 
(2014) measure the quality of the audit environment by considering the presence or absence of a 
number of factors that are likely to affect the skills and training of auditors and their incentives to 
carry out their role effectively. These factors include audit licensing, training and oversight, as well as 
levels of audit fees and litigation risk. Brown et al. (2014) show the audit environment index is useful 
for distinguishing the audit environment between countries, in addition to the explanatory power 
provided by more general proxies for legal setting. 
In H2c, we test how capital market pressure affects the association between Big N auditors 
and tax aggressiveness. We use three proxies for capital market pressure. The first measure reflects 
the importance of the equity market (EQTY), and is defined as the mean rank across the following 
three variables from La Porta et al. (1997): (1) the ratio of the aggregate stock market capitalization 
held by minorities to gross national product, (2) the number of listed domestic firms relative to the 
population, and (3) the number of IPOs relative to the population. Each variable is ranked such that 
higher scores indicate a greater importance of the stock market. The second measure, STMCAP, is the 
stock market capitalization divided by GDP. STMCAP is measured annually, with the data obtained 
from Beck et al. (2009). Third, we use the DEV index reported in Hail and Leuz (2006) to identify 
developed and developing countries. A country is considered to be developing if its equity market is 
not included in the Morgan Stanley Capital International database. DEV is coded one for a developed 
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country, and zero for a developing country. We expect capital market pressure to be stronger when 
the equity market is more important, when the size of the stock market is larger, and when the 
country is more developed.  
 
4. Results 
4.1 Sample 
We collect financial information on tax aggressiveness, auditor quality, and other firm-level control 
variables for the period 1995–2007 from the Compustat Global database.19 We select a sample of 
non-U.S. countries from the 48 countries listed in La Porta et al. (1998). We drop eleven countries 
(Columbia, Ecuador, Egypt, Jordan, Kenya, Nigeria, Sri Lanka, Malaysia, Thailand, Uruguay, and 
Zimbabwe), because of missing information to compute tax avoidance. The country-level institutional 
variables are either hand-collected (e.g., statutory tax rates, classification of worldwide or territorial 
tax system, etc.) or based on the data from related studies (e.g., La Porta et al. 1998; 2006). We drop 
Canada and Pakistan, because the information on country-level compensation data is not available, 
and Argentina and Venezuela, because each country has less than 100 firm-year observations. Lastly, 
we drop Japan and Korea because the identity of the auditors is not indicated in the database. These 
sampling and data availability criteria result in a final sample that includes 31 countries. We also trim 
each continuous firm-level variable at the 1% and 99% level to mitigate the effects of extreme values. 
Depending on the availability of data, the final sample size used in the main regression analyses 
ranges from 39,857 to 41,958 firm-year observations for the 13-year sample period. 
4.2 Descriptive Statistics 
                                                            
19 Our sample period ends in 2007 because we obtain the requisite data from the Legacy Global Compustat database. The 
last year for which data are available in this database is 2007. The new Global Compustat database, which has the more 
recent data, does not include pre-tax exceptional items (data item 57 in the old database) and foreign income taxes (data 
item 51 in the old database).  Therefore, we are unable to compute the variable TAXAVOID, which requires data item 57 
as an input and the variable BTAXC, which requires data item 51 as an input, using the new Global Compustat database. 
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Table 1 reports the sample composition and the median characteristics for each of the 31 countries. 
The sample size for each country ranges widely from 104 firm-year observations for Peru to 9,602 
firm-year observations for the U.K.20 The median tax avoidance measure (TAXAVOID) reported for 
each country is comparable to that reported in Atwood et al. (2012). 
Table 2 reports descriptive statistics of and correlations between the regression variables for 
the full sample. As observed from Table 2 Panel A, the mean (median) percentage of taxes avoided 
from pre-tax income (TAXAVOID) is 9.7% (10.0%), which based on the mean (median) statutory 
corporate tax rate (TAXRATE) of 32.6% (31.0%), implies that the mean (median) firm in our sample 
paid a tax rate of 22.9% (21.0%). On average, 53.6% of the firm-year observations in the sample 
employed Big N auditors.  
Table 2 Panel B reports Pearson correlations between the variables in our analyses. We 
observe a significantly negative correlation between auditor quality (BIGN) and aggressive tax 
avoidance (TAXAGGR). Because these are pairwise univariate correlations, we defer the main 
inferences to multivariate tests, reported in the following section. 
4.3 Main Analyses – Test of H1 
In this section, we report the results for the test of H1, which examines the association between 
auditor quality and aggressive tax avoidance measured by TAXAGGR, an indicator variable equals 
one if the tax avoidance is within the top quintile in each country-industry combination, and zero 
otherwise. In Column 1, we regress tax aggressiveness on auditor quality, country, year, and industry 
fixed-effects, and exclude the firm-level control variables. In Column 2, we report the results 
including firm-level control variables, and in Column 3, we report the results including additional 
                                                            
20 In a robustness test, we exclude sample observations from the U.K. to mitigate concerns that our results are driven by 
the disproportionately large number of observations from this country. The results are robust to the exclusion of firms 
from the U.K. (see Section 5.4). 
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controls for country-level tax system characteristics. In all three columns, we report a negative and 
statistically significant coefficient on BIGN, which is consistent with the notion that auditor quality is 
negatively related to the likelihood of corporate tax aggressiveness even after controlling for legal 
institutions such as home-country tax systems.21  
The coefficients of the control variables are consistent with expectations. Similar to Atwood 
et al. (2012), we find that tax system characteristics, such as having a worldwide tax system (WW), 
higher required book-tax conformity (BTAXC), and greater perceived tax enforcement (TAXENF), are 
associated with lower likelihood of tax aggressiveness. We also find that in countries with higher 
statutory tax rates (TAXRATE) and higher real GDP per capita (LGDP), firms are more likely to be 
tax aggressive, possibly due to the additional incentives to avoid taxes when statutory tax rates are 
higher, and when the economy is growing. The coefficient on TREND is negative and significant, 
suggesting that the likelihood of tax aggressiveness decreases with declining statutory tax rates over 
time. Turning to the firm-level control variables, we find that more profitable (PROA) and larger 
(SIZE) firms are less likely to be tax aggressive, possibly due to additional political scrutiny of such 
firms. We also find that firms with higher leverage (LEV) and sales growth (GROWTH) are more 
likely to be tax aggressive, consistent with greater opportunities to avoid taxes for firms with more 
debt and greater marginal benefits of avoiding taxes for growth firms. Consistent with Atwood et al. 
(2012), we find that firms with multi-national operations are less likely to be tax aggressive. Lastly, 
consistent with prior studies (Frank et al. 2009; Wilson 2009; Lisowsky 2010; Atwood et al. 2012), 
we find that all three components of accruals are positively associated with the likelihood of tax 
aggressiveness. This result indicates that the relation between auditor quality and the likelihood of tax 
                                                            
21 We also compute the marginal effect of BIGN, which indicates that employing a Big N auditor rather than a non-big N 
auditor reduces the likelihood of tax aggressiveness by 4.18%.  This magnitude is comparable with the effect of three tax 
system characteristics examined by Atwood et al. (2012) on tax aggressiveness. Specifically, the marginal effect of WW, 
BTAXC, and TAXENF on tax aggressiveness is 4.12%, 3.76%, and 1.79%, respectively. 
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aggressiveness that we document is not solely driven by accruals management, but is also related to 
the use of other tax planning strategies.22 
 Overall, the results indicate that auditor quality is significantly negatively associated with tax 
aggressiveness, consistent with the reasoning that high quality auditors are concerned about risky tax 
avoidance activities, possibly due to reputational concerns and litigation exposure. 
4.4 Cross-sectional Analyses – Tests of H2 
In this section, we test cross-sectional variation in the relation between auditor quality and tax 
aggressiveness. In particular, we are interested in whether differences in institutional characteristics 
affect the relationship between Big N auditors and tax aggressiveness. In H2a, we examine the 
moderating role of investor protection (measured by COMMON, LAWE, and ANTIDEAL). The results 
of our tests are presented in Table 4. The results indicate that for all three measures of investor 
protection, the negative association between auditor quality and the likelihood of tax aggressiveness 
is accentuated in countries with higher investor protection. Our results are consistent with Francis and 
Wang (2008) but inconsistent with Choi et al. (2008), and suggest that the negative association 
between Big N auditors and the likelihood of tax aggressiveness is more pronounced when investor 
protection is higher.  
 In H2b, we examine the moderating role of auditor litigation risk (BURDEN, LITIG) and the 
audit environment (AUDENV). The results presented in Table 5 indicate that the coefficients on the 
interaction between BIGN*BURDEN, BIGN*LITIG, and BIGN*AUDENV are all negative and 
significant at conventional levels. The evidence indicates that the negative relation between BIGN 
                                                            
22 The correlations between some variables in the model are very high. For example, the correlation between PROA and 
GROWTH is 0.82, and the correlation between the country-level institutional controls such as TAXENF, PCTEQ, and 
LGDP are also highly correlated with our institutional variables used in testing H2 (see Table 2). Given this high level of 
correlation, we check the variance inflation factor (VIF) in this and all other empirical tests to ensure that multicollinearity 
is not driving our results. The VIFs are all less than 10, indicating that multicollinearity is not a serious concern (Neter et 
al. 1996; Kennedy 2008). As a second sensitivity check, we re-estimate the regressions after removing GROWTH, 
TAXENF, PCTEQ, and LGDP. Our results are robust to the exclusion of these variables. 
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and the likelihood of tax aggressiveness is more pronounced in countries where auditors are faced 
with higher litigation risk and a better audit environment.  
In H2c, we examine the moderating role of the capital market pressure which is proxied by the 
importance of the equity market (EQTY), stock market capitalization (STMCAP), and an indicator 
variable for developed economy (DEV). We expect the auditor to play a greater role in countries 
where the capital market pressure is higher. The results of our tests, presented in Table 6, indicate that 
the coefficients on the interactions BIGN*EQTY, BIGN*STMCAP, and BIGN*DEV are all negative 
and significant at the 1% level, consistent with our prediction that the negative relation between Big 
N auditors and the likelihood of tax aggressiveness is more pronounced in countries where capital 
market pressure is higher.  
  Overall, the results presented in Tables 4 through 6 indicate that the negative association 
between Big N auditors and the likelihood of tax aggressiveness is more pronounced when investor 
protection is higher, auditors’ exposure to litigation is higher, the audit environment is better, and 
capital market pressure is higher.  
 
5. Additional Analyses And Sensitivity Checks 
5.1 Alternate Measures of Tax Aggressiveness 
In our main analysis, we use an indicator variable to capture tax aggressiveness. We also test the 
robustness of our results using two alternate measures of corporate tax avoidance. First, we use the 
continuous tax avoidance measure (TAXAVOID) as the dependent variable. Second, because of the 
potential concern that TAXAGGR may not reflect and adequately control for different tax planning 
opportunities that vary across different countries and different industries, we compute tax 
aggressiveness based on the country-industry mean-adjusted tax avoidance (ADJ_TAXAGGR), i.e., 
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the firm-year specific TAXAVOID minus the mean TAXAVOID in each country-industry combination. 
The results of the analyses using these two alternate measures of tax aggressiveness are reported in 
Table 7. We continue to find that BIGN is negatively associated with these two alternate proxies of 
tax aggressiveness.  
5.2 Alternate Proxies for Auditor Quality 
To strengthen our inferences that high quality auditors play a role in influencing corporate tax 
aggressiveness, we explore alternate proxies that represent different dimensions of auditor quality 
beyond the Big N/non-Big N dichotomy. Prior studies (e.g., Balsam et al. 2003; Kwon et al. 2007) 
show that audits provided by industry specialist auditors have higher quality. Therefore, if high 
quality auditors are negatively associated with corporate tax aggressiveness, we should observe that 
industry specialist auditors that presumably provide higher quality audits have a more pronounced 
effect. We measure auditor industry specialization as: 1) the auditor with the largest industry market 
share in the respective country-industry combination (SPEC1); and 2) the industry market share of 
the auditor is above a certain threshold (as outlined in Neal and Riley 2004) in the respective country-
industry combination (SPEC2).23 
Following prior studies (e.g., Kwon et al. 2007), we restrict our study to clients of Big N 
auditors to control for brand name so that any incremental effect that we observe from our alternative 
proxies of auditor quality will reflect variation in audit quality unexplained by the Big N/non-Big N 
dichotomy. The results are presented in Table 8. We observe that both measures of auditor industry 
specialization (SPEC1 and SPEC2) are significantly associated with lower likelihood of corporate tax 
                                                            
23 Following Neal and Riley (2004), the appropriate cut off for the market share is given by (1/n) * 1.2, where n is the 
number of big international audit firms. There are Big 6 auditors during the period 1993 to 1997, Big 5 and Big 4 auditors, 
respectively, after the merger between Coopers and Lybrand and Price Waterhouse in 1998, and the demise of Arthur 
Andersen in 2001. Conceptually, industry market share would be measured as audit fees earned by an auditor in an 
industry, as a proportion of the total audit fees earned by all auditors that served in that particular industry. Because of 
limitation of audit fees data in the international context, we follow Kwon et al. (2007) and compute market share based on 
the audit clients’ assets. To ensure that Big N auditors develop significant expertise in each industry, we require a 
minimum of 50 clients in each industry in a given year.  
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aggressiveness among firms audited by the Big N auditors. These results confirm our conclusion that 
auditor quality is negatively related to the likelihood of corporate tax aggressiveness. 
5.3 Tax Aggressiveness of Clients that Switched Auditors  
A potential concern with the previous analyses is that auditor choice may not be exogenous. Omitted 
variables may be correlated with both the choice for a Big N auditor and tax aggressiveness. These 
potential omitted variables could also be related to firms’ incentives and inclinations to be tax 
aggressive in a given country, and thus our findings may be spurious. Our cross-sectional analyses 
mitigate this concern because it is harder for an omitted correlated variable to explain both our main 
and our cross-sectional findings. Also, in all our main and cross-sectional analyses, we include 
additional controls for country-level institutional variables such as tax system characteristics, and thus 
it is more difficult to find an omitted latent institutional variable that explains both auditor quality and 
tax aggressiveness in our analyses.  
In this section, we provide some exploratory evidence on the change in tax aggressiveness for 
firms that switch from a non-Big N to a Big N auditor, and vice versa. Such a change analysis will 
mitigate concerns about self-selection bias and unobserved heterogeneity, and increase confidence in 
the observed association between the underlying constructs under investigation. We compare the 
change in tax avoidance (i.e., ∆TAXAVOID = TAXAVOIDt – TAXAVOIDt-1) for firms that change 
auditors from year t-1 to year t.24 We expect to find a decrease (increase) in tax avoidance for firms 
switching from a non-Big N (Big N) to a Big N (non-Big N) auditor. We report the univariate results, 
based on non-parametric tests, in Table 9. Overall, there are 5,118 clients that switched auditors 
during the sample period. Consistent with our expectation, tax avoidance decreases by 0.85% 
(median) for firms that switch from a non-Big N to a Big N auditor, whereas it increases by 1.00% 
                                                            
24 We examine the change in tax avoidance (TAXAVOID) instead of tax aggressiveness (TAXAGGR) because the latter is 
an indicator variable and thus there is little variation in this variable for a given firm across two time periods, which 
reduces the power of our test substantially. 
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(median) for firms that switch from a Big N to a non-Big N auditor. The change in tax avoidance is 
statistically significant at 1% for both groups of switchers. Overall, the univariate analysis presented 
in Table 9 is consistent with the notion that Big N auditors are associated with lower tax 
aggressiveness. 
5.4 Additional Robustness Checks 
In this section, we discuss a few additional robustness checks. As highlighted earlier, a significant 
portion of our firm-year observations consists of firms from the U.K. To mitigate the concern that our 
results are driven by observations from the U.K., we re-estimate the main model after excluding U.K. 
firms. The untabulated results indicate that BIGN is still associated with lower likelihood of tax 
aggressiveness (z = -4.96, p=0.00).  
 Boone et al. (2010) examine audit quality for Big 4 and second-tier auditors (Grant Thornton 
and BDO Seidman) and find that there are no actual audit quality differences, in terms of going 
concern opinions and abnormal accruals, between Big N auditors and second-tier auditors. As another 
sensitivity check, we include an additional indicator variable for the second-tier auditor in the model. 
Interestingly, the (untabulated) results indicate that both the Big N auditors and the second-tier 
auditors are significantly associated with lower likelihood of  tax aggressiveness (z=-6.38 and z=-
2.46 respectively), a result that is consistent with Boone et al. (2010).  
The collapse of Arthur Andersen led to changes in the U.S. and other countries to improve the 
quality of audit from 2002 onwards. Key initiatives to increase auditor independence include 
restricting the provision of non-audit services to audit clients, requiring firm audit partner rotation and 
introducing independent oversight bodies with the power to review audit firms’ working papers and 
to take any corrective action deemed necessary (Zhang 2007; Hart 2009). Hence, we assess whether 
the relation between Big N auditors and tax aggressiveness differs between the pre- and post-2002 
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periods. The results are reported in Table 10, which indicate that Big N auditors are associated with 
lower likelihood of tax aggressiveness in both the pre- and the post-2002 period. However, the 
negative and significant interaction term BIGN*POST suggests that Big N auditors are more 
negatively associated with the likelihood of tax aggressiveness in the post-2002 period, consistent 
with higher audit quality in the post-Enron era.  
In our main cross-sectional tests, we include institutional variables one at a time to assess how 
these institutions may affect the behavior of Big N auditor on tax aggressiveness. In our final 
sensitivity check, we re-estimate the regression with all three principal components (IP for the 
investor protection proxies, AUDIT for the auditor litigation risk and enforcement proxies, and 
MARKET for the capital market pressure proxies) in the same regression. Untabulated results indicate 
that the coefficient on BIGN*LEGAL is negative and marginally significant (z=-1.64, p=0.10), the 
coefficient on BIGN*MARKET is negative and significant (z=-4.38, p=0.00), while the coefficient on 
BIGN*AUDIT is statistically insignificant. The results suggest that when all three principal 
components are included in the same regression specification, the effect of AUDIT appears to be 
subsumed by IP and MARKET. However, caution is required in interpreting these results as the 
correlation between IP and AUDIT is high (0.67).  
  
6. Conclusion 
Prior studies primarily explore the determinants of tax aggressiveness across firms within one 
country, and mainly within the U.S. A notable exception is Atwood et al. (2012), who document that 
tax system characteristics such as required book-tax conformity, worldwide versus territorial 
approach, and strength of tax enforcement are related to tax avoidance. We extend this important line 
of research by examining whether auditor quality, proxied by Big N auditors, also relates to corporate 
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tax aggressiveness. Following Atwood et al. (2012), we measure tax avoidance broadly as the 
difference between the tax on pre-tax income computed at the home-country statutory corporate tax 
rate and the taxes actually paid. To capture tax aggressiveness, we use an indicator variable which 
equals one if the firm’s tax avoidance measure is within the top quintile of each country-industry 
combination, and zero otherwise. This measure attempts to capture the aggressive tax-related 
activities that auditors presumably are concerned about in their audits and thus more closely related to 
our research question.  
Using a large sample of firm-year observations from 31 countries and logistic estimation, we 
find robust evidence that auditor quality is negatively associated with the likelihood of tax 
aggressiveness, even after controlling for legal institutions such as tax system characteristics that 
have been documented to be associated with the likelihood of  tax aggressiveness (Atwood et al. 
2012). In additional analyses, we find that auditor quality has a more pronounced relation with the 
likelihood of tax aggressiveness when investor protection is stronger, auditor litigation risk is higher, 
the audit environment is better, and capital market pressure is higher. Finally, we find that firms 
audited by industry specialist auditors exhibit lower likelihood of tax aggressiveness, strengthening 
our inferences that high quality auditors are associated with lower corporate tax aggressiveness. We 
also find that the negative relation between Big N auditors and the likelihood of tax aggressiveness is 
more pronounced in the post-2002 period after the collapse of Arthur Andersen, presumably because 
of the key initiatives implemented to improve audit quality following the Enron scandal. We subject 
our results to a number of robustness tests, including using two alternate measures of tax 
aggressiveness and excluding firms from the U.K., and provide exploratory evidence on the change in 
tax aggressiveness for firms that switch auditors during the sample period. Our main inference that 
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firms audited by a Big N auditor are associated with lower tax aggressiveness is robust to these 
additional tests. 
Our study is subject to several limitations. First, our cross-country firm-level measure of tax 
aggressiveness is based on a simple difference between the home-country statutory tax rate and the 
cash effective tax rate. To the extent that this measure is influenced by the firm’s foreign operations 
which are taxed at a different statutory tax rate, it will be noisy. However, this noise is likely to bias 
against finding the documented results. Second, because firms’ incentive to be tax aggressive is likely 
to be influenced by home-country norms, tax system characteristics, and other institutional factors, 
our findings could be affected by the extent to which these factors are correlated with our test variable 
and not controlled for in our empirical estimation. Third, because we cannot directly observe or 
identify the specific mechanisms through which auditor quality affects tax aggressiveness, we note 
that the reported relations between high quality auditors and tax aggressiveness across countries are 
observed associations, and may not result from underlying causal relations. For instance, due to data 
limitation, we are not able to observe whether high quality auditors influence tax aggressiveness 
through an external audit procedure solely and/or through the provision of APTS and thus, we are not 
able to conclude how external auditors influence tax aggressiveness in our study. Future studies with 
access to finer data can take this step to further our understanding of how external auditors 
specifically influence corporate tax aggressiveness. Finally, firms’ choice of external auditors is not 
exogenous. For instance, an alternate explanation for our findings is that firms seeking to be tax 
aggressive may choose a lower quality auditor to avoid scrutiny by their external auditors. Our results 
should be interpreted cautiously in light of these limitations. 
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APPENDIX: Variable Definitions 
 
TAXAVOID = Measure of tax avoidance, defined as: 
ሾ∑ ሺܲܶܧܤܺ ൈ ߬ሻ௜௧ െ ∑ ܥܶ ௜ܲ௧ሿ௧௧ିଶ௧௧ିଶ
∑ ܲܶܧܤ ௜ܺ௧௧௧ିଶ  
where PTEBX is pre-tax earnings before exceptional items,  
is home-country statutory corporate tax rate, and CTP is 
current taxes paid. The extent of tax avoidance is increasing 
in this measure. 
TAXAGGR = An indicator variable that equals one if TAXAVOID (defined 
above) is within the top quintile in each country-industry 
combination, and zero otherwise. This variable captures tax 
aggressiveness. 
ADJ_TAXAGGR = Country-industry mean-adjusted measure of tax 
aggressiveness, computed as the firm-year specific 
TAXAVOID minus the mean TAXAVOID in each country-
industry combination. The extent of tax aggressiveness is 
increasing in this measure. 
BIGN = Indicator variable that equals one if the firm’s auditor is a Big 
N auditor, and zero otherwise. 
COMMON = An indicator variable that equals one if the country is a 
common law country, and zero otherwise. 
LAWE = The mean score of three legal enforcement variables reported 
in La Porta et al. (1998). The three variables are (1) the mean 
for 1980–1983 of a variable provided by Business 
International Corp., capturing the efficiency and integrity of 
the judicial system; (2) the mean for 1982–1995 of a rule of 
law variable obtained from International Country Risk; and 
(3) the mean for 1982–1995 of a corruption variable that 
assesses the corruption in government, obtained from 
International Country Risk.  The law enforcement index 
values range from zero to ten, with higher scores for greater 
law enforcement. 
ANTIDEAL = Anti-self-dealing index of the country, based on Djankov et 
al. (2008). 
BURDEN = The arithmetic mean of (1) liability standard for the issuer and 
its directors, (2) liability standard for the distributor, and (3) 
liability standard for the accountant. The index is increasing 
in litigation risk exposure. Data from La Porta et al. (2006). 
LITIG = Auditor litigation risk index from Wingate (1997), which is a 
direct proxy for legal liability of audit firms in each country 
and measures the level of litigiousness in a country. The 
rating is developed by an international insurance underwriter 
for one of the Big N audit firms. The variable ranges from 1 
to 15 and represents the “risk of doing business as an auditor” 
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in a particular country, with higher score indicating higher 
level of litigiousness. 
AUDENV = Audit environment index in year 2002 reported by Brown et 
al. (2014) to capture differences between countries in relation 
to the institutional setting for the auditing of financial 
statements, with higher values indicating better audit 
environment. 
EQTY = The mean rank across three variables used in La Porta et al. 
(1997) (1) the ratio of the aggregate stock market 
capitalization held by minorities to gross national product, (2) 
the number of listed domestic firms relative to the population, 
and (3) the number of IPOs relative to the population. Each 
variable is ranked such that higher scores indicate a greater 
importance of the stock market. 
STMCAP = Annual stock market capitalization divided by GDP from 
Beck et al. (2009). 
DEV = An indicator equals one for the developed country, and zero 
for the developing country. A country is considered to be 
developing if its equity market is not included in the Morgan 
Stanley Capital International database (Hail and Leuz 2006). 
TAXRATE = Country statutory tax rate. 
EARNVOL = The scaled descending rank, between zero and one, of cross-
sectional pre-tax earnings volatility by country-year, 
following Atwood et al. (2012). Pre-tax earnings are defined 
as pre-tax income before exceptional items, divided by lagged 
total assets. 
WW = Indicator variable that equals one if the home-country adopts 
a worldwide tax system, and zero if the home-country adopts 
a territorial tax system. 
BTAXC = Proxy for the level of required book-tax conformity, 
following Atwood et al. (2010). BTAXC is computed based on 
the conditional variance of current tax expense from the 
following model, estimated by country-year: 
ܥܶܧ௧ ൌ ߠ଴ ൅ ߠଵܲܶܤܫ௧ ൅ ߠଶܨ݋ݎܲܶܤܫ௧ ൅ ߠଷܦܫ ௧ܸ ൅ ݁௧  
where CTE is current tax expense, PTBI is pre-tax book 
income, ForPTBI is estimated foreign pre-tax book income, 
DIV is total dividends, and all variables are scaled by average 
total assets. BTAXC is then computed as the scaled ranking of 
the root mean squared errors (RMSE) from these country-year 
regressions, and RMSEs are ranked in descending order so 
that higher values of BTAXC indicate higher required book-
tax conformity. 
TAXENF = Proxy for the level of tax enforcement in the country, based 
on the 1996 World Competitiveness Report. 
PCTEQ = Sum of the value of option compensation and restricted stock 
compensation divided by total compensation at the country 
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level, to proxy for CEO incentives. Data is obtained from 
Bryan et al. (2010). 
LGDP = Log of Real historical Gross Domestic Product per capita (in 
billions of 2005 dollars). Source: 
www.ers.usda.gov/datafiles/International_Macroeconomic_D
ata/...Data  
TREND = Time trend variable, defined as the current fiscal year minus 
the first fiscal year in our sample (1995). 
PROA = Pre-tax return on assets. 
SIZE = Natural logarithm of total assets (in U.S. dollars). 
R&D = Research and development expenditures scaled by total assets.
LEV = Total liabilities scaled by total assets 
GROWTH = Percentage change in sales. 
MULTI = Indicator variable that equals zero if foreign income taxes is 
missing or zero, and equals one otherwise. 
WC = Change in current operating assets minus current operating 
liabilities, scaled by total assets. 
NCO = Change in noncurrent operating assets minus noncurrent 
operating liabilities, scaled by total assets. 
FIN = Change in financial assets minus financial liabilities, scaled 
by total assets. 
SPEC1 = An indicator that equals one if the auditor has the largest 
industry market share in the respective country-industry 
combination, and zero otherwise. 
SPEC2 = An indicator that equals one if the industry market share of 
the auditor is more than 20 percent for the period prior to 
1998, 24 percent for the period 1998 to 2001, and 30 percent 
for the period after 2002 (Neal and Riley 2004), and zero 
otherwise. 
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TABLE 1 
Sample Composition and Median Characteristics by Country 
Country N TAXAVOID BIGN COMMON LAWE ANTIDEAL BURDEN LITIG AUDENV EQTY STMCAP DEV TAXENF WW 
Australia 3,469 0.26 0 1 9.51 0.79 0.66 10.00 16 24.00 108.39 1 4.58 0 
Austria 616 0.14 0 0 9.36 0.21 0.11 3.61 12 7.00 15.43 1 3.60 0 
Belgium 662 0.11 1 0 9.44 0.54 0.44 4.82 12 11.30 73.82 1 2.27 0 
Brazil 441 0.09 1 0 6.13 0.29 0.33 4.82 8 - 57.07 0 2.14 1 
Chile 341 0.04 1 0 6.52 0.63 0.33 2.42 2 - - 0 4.20 1 
Denmark 1,065 0.05 1 0 10.00 0.47 0.55 4.82 15 20.00 57.68 1 3.70 0 
Finland 974 0.01 1 0 10.00 0.46 0.66 3.61 10 13.70 114.61 1 3.53 0 
France 3,968 0.08 0 0 8.68 0.38 0.22 6.22 15 9.30 77.87 1 3.86 0 
Germany 4,039 0.17 0 0 9.05 0.28 0.00 6.22 13 5.00 45.37 1 3.41 0 
Greece 497 0.10 0 0 6.82 0.23 0.50 3.61 7 11.50 67.46 0 2.36 1 
Hong Kong 709 0.05 1 1 8.91 0.96 0.66 10.00 16 28.80 358.58 1 4.56 0 
India 1,360 0.20 0 1 5.58 0.55 0.66 2.42 9 14.00 34.26 0 2.16 1 
Indonesia 812 0.10 0 0 2.88 0.68 0.66 3.61 6 4.70 24.31 0 2.53 1 
Ireland 418 0.11 1 1 8.36 0.79 0.44 6.22 15 17.30 62.40 1 3.55 1 
Israel 137 0.14 0 1 7.72 0.71 0.66 - 10 - 68.27 0 3.69 1 
Italy 1,481 0.08 1 0 7.07 0.39 0.22 6.22 15 6.50 44.55 1 1.77 0 
Mexico 300 0.12 1 0 5.37 0.18 0.11 4.82 8 - 20.38 0 2.46 1 
Netherlands 1,312 0.11 1 0 10.00 0.21 0.89 6.22 7 19.30 102.66 1 3.40 0 
New Zealand 504 0.12 1 1 10.00 0.95 0.44 10.00 14 - 39.09 1 5.00 0 
Norway 819 0.14 1 0 10.00 0.44 0.39 6.22 15 20.30 38.10 1 3.96 1 
Peru 104 0.14 0 0 4.65 0.41 0.66 2.42 9 - 26.32 0 2.66 1 
Philippines 496 0.14 0 0 3.47 0.24 1.00 3.61 4 5.70 41.88 0 1.83 1 
Portugal 254 0.13 0 0 7.19 0.49 0.66 3.61 7 11.80 42.40 0 2.18 0 
Singapore 1,793 0.04 1 1 8.93 1.00 0.66 4.82 13 28.80 188.99 1 5.05 0 
South Africa 672 0.27 0 0 6.45 0.81 0.66 4.82 9 16.30 209.40 0 2.40 1 
Spain 1,013 0.16 1 0 7.14 0.37 0.66 4.82 12 7.20 75.51 1 1.91 0 
Sweden 1,638 0.06 1 0 10.00 0.34 0.28 4.82 17 16.70 104.38 1 3.39 1 
Switzerland 1,773 0.07 1 0 10.00 0.27 0.44 6.22 15 24.80 229.04 1 4.49 0 
Taiwan 415 0.17 1 0 7.37 0.56 0.66 3.61 8 13.30 - 0 3.25 1 
Turkey 274 0.21 1 0 4.79 0.43 0.22 2.42 10 - 23.12 0 2.07 1 
United Kingdom 9,602 0.05 1 1 9.22 0.93 0.66 10.00 18 25.00 139.46 1 4.67 1 
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TABLE 1 (continued) 
Country BTAXC TAXRATE PCTEQ LGDP EARNVOL PROA SIZE R&D LEV GROWTH MULTI ∆WC ∆NCO ∆FIN 
Australia 0.14 0.30 0.31 10.42 0.22 0.09 5.16 0.00 0.19 0.09 0 0.01 0.03 0.00 
Austria 0.76 0.34 0.00 10.48 0.82 0.05 7.13 0.00 0.24 0.04 0 0.00 0.01 0.00 
Belgium 0.76 0.40 0.00 10.43 0.60 0.06 6.59 0.00 0.22 0.05 0 0.00 0.01 0.00 
Brazil 0.48 0.34 0.02 8.58 0.64 0.09 7.98 0.00 0.25 0.10 0 0.01 0.02 -0.03 
Chile 0.88 0.17 0.00 8.89 0.11 0.08 8.60 0.00 0.24 0.05 0 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Denmark 0.36 0.30 0.11 10.73 0.62 0.07 7.55 0.00 0.24 0.06 0 0.01 0.02 0.00 
Finland 0.43 0.28 0.03 10.45 0.60 0.08 6.64 0.00 0.22 0.04 0 0.01 0.01 0.00 
France 0.48 0.34 0.14 10.41 0.35 0.06 6.47 0.00 0.21 0.05 0 0.00 0.01 0.00 
Germany 0.12 0.38 0.05 10.42 0.40 0.07 6.16 0.00 0.16 0.04 0 0.01 0.01 0.00 
Greece 0.76 0.35 0.00 9.85 0.69 0.07 6.33 0.00 0.29 0.09 0 0.01 0.03 -0.04 
Hong Kong 0.79 0.18 0.01 10.07 0.38 0.07 8.00 0.00 0.16 0.07 1 0.00 0.01 0.00 
India 0.24 0.37 0.14 6.43 0.16 0.12 9.22 0.00 0.21 0.12 0 0.01 0.02 0.01 
Indonesia 0.33 0.30 0.00 7.10 0.09 0.08 7.65 0.00 0.24 0.08 0 0.02 0.01 0.00 
Ireland 0.69 0.24 0.11 10.61 0.45 0.09 5.92 0.00 0.28 0.13 1 0.01 0.04 -0.01 
Israel 0.71 0.36 0.16 9.80 0.69 0.06 7.39 0.01 0.26 0.09 0 0.00 0.01 -0.01 
Italy 0.57 0.40 0.05 10.30 0.69 0.06 7.26 0.00 0.24 0.04 0 0.00 0.01 -0.01 
Mexico 0.40 0.33 0.00 8.87 0.05 0.10 9.10 0.00 0.23 0.08 0 0.00 0.03 0.00 
Netherlands 0.40 0.35 0.25 10.50 0.45 0.08 6.64 0.00 0.22 0.05 0 0.00 0.01 0.00 
New Zealand 0.50 0.33 0.42 10.07 0.44 0.09 5.66 0.00 0.27 0.06 0 0.01 0.02 0.00 
Norway 0.10 0.28 0.00 11.03 0.38 0.07 7.58 0.00 0.29 0.09 0 0.01 0.02 -0.01 
Peru 0.88 0.30 0.00 7.90 0.62 0.14 7.06 0.00 0.23 0.06 0 0.01 0.01 0.00 
Philippines 0.49 0.32 0.00 6.98 0.53 0.07 8.78 0.00 0.21 0.05 0 0.01 0.01 0.00 
Portugal 0.86 0.35 0.00 9.70 1.02 0.05 7.91 0.00 0.35 0.06 0 0.00 0.02 -0.01 
Singapore 0.64 0.22 0.13 10.15 0.38 0.07 5.17 0.00 0.15 0.07 0 0.01 0.01 0.00 
South Africa 0.17 0.38 0.31 8.45 0.51 0.16 7.51 0.00 0.12 0.14 0 0.01 0.03 0.00 
Spain 0.74 0.35 0.02 10.11 0.20 0.07 7.76 0.00 0.22 0.08 0 0.00 0.02 -0.01 
Sweden 0.36 0.28 0.09 10.52 0.45 0.09 8.26 0.00 0.20 0.07 0 0.01 0.02 0.00 
Switzerland 0.69 0.25 0.04 10.78 0.78 0.07 6.66 0.00 0.22 0.04 0 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Taiwan 0.90 0.25 0.00 9.53 0.18 0.06 9.61 0.00 0.23 0.07 0 0.00 0.02 0.00 
Turkey 0.44 0.33 0.00 8.33 0.36 0.11 8.19 0.00 0.16 0.26 0 0.03 0.05 -0.01 
United Kingdom 0.19 0.30 0.20 10.44 0.20 0.09 5.00 0.00 0.18 0.07 1 0.00 0.02 0.00 
This table provides the sample composition and selected mean characteristics by country. The detailed definitions of the variables are provided in the Appendix. 
All continuous variables are trimmed at the 1 and 99 percentiles.  
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TABLE 2 
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics 
Mean Median Q1 Q3 Std Dev 
TAXAGGR 0.198 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.398 
TAXAVOID 0.097 0.100 -0.004 0.235 0.217 
BIGN 0.536 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.499 
COMMON 0.429 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.495 
LAWE 8.641 9.223 8.677 9.507 1.550 
ANTIDEAL 0.590 0.490 0.340 0.930 0.280 
BURDEN 0.487 0.660 0.220 0.660 0.248 
LITIG 6.815 6.220 4.820 10.000 2.502 
AUDENV 13.944 15.000 12.000 17.000 3.713 
EQTY 17.241 19.300 9.300 25.000 8.172 
STMCAP 105.520 96.572 52.662 139.464 67.603 
DEV 0.860 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.347 
TAXENF 3.766 3.860 3.400 4.670 0.970 
WW 0.460 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.498 
BTAXC 0.394 0.333 0.167 0.595 0.262 
TAXRATE 0.326 0.310 0.300 0.360 0.072 
PCTEQ 0.130 0.138 0.040 0.197 0.101 
LGDP 10.074 10.398 10.261 10.479 0.985 
EARNVOL 0.379 0.309 0.182 0.545 0.242 
PROA 0.207 0.079 0.040 0.135 2.244 
SIZE 6.577 6.447 4.860 8.155 2.340 
R&D 0.008 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.028 
LEV 0.214 0.200 0.077 0.321 0.170 
GROWTH 0.290 0.065 -0.017 0.184 2.818 
MULTI 0.196 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.397 
∆WC 0.003 0.005 -0.027 0.041 0.110 
∆NCO 0.033 0.016 -0.018 0.074 0.178 
∆FIN -0.012 -0.001 -0.063 0.044 0.158 
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TABLE 2 (continued) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
(1) TAXAGGR 1.00 
(2) TAXAVOID 0.53 1.00 
(3) BIGN -0.09 -0.20 1.00 
(4) COMMON 0.00 -0.02 0.01 1.00 
(5) LAWE 0.00 -0.06 0.15 0.17 1.00 
(6) ANTIDEAL 0.00 -0.07 0.06 0.89 0.12 1.00 
(7) BURDEN 0.00 -0.04 0.05 0.56 -0.07 0.59 1.00 
(8) LITIG 0.00 -0.02 0.08 0.69 0.49 0.65 0.27 1.00 
(9) AUDENV 0.00 -0.09 0.10 0.51 0.62 0.48 -0.04 0.77 1.00 
(10) EQTY 0.00 -0.10 0.15 0.76 0.46 0.75 0.65 0.61 0.52 1.00 
(11) STMCAP -0.01 -0.12 0.03 0.40 0.34 0.47 0.41 0.39 0.34 0.70 1.00 
(12) DEV 0.00 -0.08 0.15 0.14 0.83 0.12 -0.18 0.53 0.72 0.26 0.23 1.00 
(13) TAXENF 0.00 -0.10 0.10 0.63 0.66 0.63 0.24 0.71 0.64 0.78 0.54 0.54 1.00 
(14) WW 0.01 0.00 0.05 0.31 -0.34 0.34 0.23 0.15 0.03 0.16 -0.03 -0.40 -0.02 1.00 
(15) BTAXC 0.01 -0.06 -0.05 -0.32 -0.13 -0.26 -0.08 -0.41 -0.30 -0.17 0.05 -0.11 -0.21 -0.31 
(16) TAXRATE 0.04 0.18 -0.03 -0.32 -0.13 -0.40 -0.49 -0.09 -0.10 -0.64 -0.59 -0.01 -0.42 0.08 
(17) PCTEQ 0.00 0.07 -0.02 0.65 0.33 0.58 0.45 0.66 0.40 0.57 0.21 0.23 0.53 0.02 
(18) LGDP 0.00 -0.09 0.16 -0.01 0.87 0.03 -0.22 0.49 0.63 0.26 0.26 0.86 0.53 -0.37 
(19) EARNVOL 0.02 0.01 -0.08 -0.42 0.04 -0.43 -0.21 -0.41 -0.25 -0.22 -0.06 -0.04 -0.26 -0.33 
(20) PROA 0.02 0.02 0.00 -0.02 -0.08 -0.01 0.01 -0.04 -0.05 -0.03 -0.03 -0.06 -0.05 0.03 
(21) SIZE -0.06 -0.01 0.13 -0.31 -0.30 -0.31 -0.10 -0.41 -0.34 -0.28 -0.18 -0.33 -0.40 0.03 
(22) R&D -0.02 -0.04 0.02 -0.04 0.10 -0.05 -0.05 0.01 0.05 -0.01 0.02 0.07 0.04 -0.02 
(23) LEV 0.02 -0.01 0.05 -0.08 -0.03 -0.07 -0.01 -0.07 -0.06 -0.05 -0.07 -0.04 -0.06 -0.03 
(24) GROWTH 0.04 0.04 -0.01 -0.01 -0.09 0.00 0.02 -0.04 -0.05 -0.03 -0.02 -0.07 -0.05 0.03 
(25) MULTI -0.09 -0.17 0.19 0.34 0.15 0.38 0.17 0.34 0.31 0.32 0.27 0.15 0.29 0.26 
(26) ∆WC 0.03 0.05 -0.02 0.05 -0.01 0.05 0.05 0.01 0.00 0.06 0.03 -0.02 0.03 0.04 
(27) ∆NCO 0.06 0.09 -0.06 0.09 0.03 0.08 0.05 0.09 0.06 0.09 0.04 0.01 0.06 0.05 
(28) ∆FIN -0.01 -0.03 0.04 -0.03 0.00 -0.03 -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 
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TABLE 2 (continued) 
(15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) (25) (26) (27) 
(15) BTAXC 1.00 
(16) TAXRATE -0.29 1.00 
(17) PCTEQ -0.40 -0.05 1.00 
(18) LGDP 0.00 -0.08 0.14 1.00 
(19) EARNVOL 0.40 0.00 -0.34 0.07 1.00 
(20) PROA -0.01 -0.01 -0.03 -0.07 -0.06 1.00 
(21) SIZE 0.19 0.07 -0.32 -0.32 0.09 0.09 1.00 
(22) R&D -0.02 0.00 -0.03 0.08 0.03 0.00 -0.03 1.00 
(23) LEV 0.05 -0.01 -0.06 -0.01 0.07 0.00 0.21 -0.10 1.00 
(24) GROWTH 0.00 -0.01 -0.03 -0.07 -0.06 0.82 0.11 0.00 0.03 1.00 
(25) MULTI -0.13 -0.17 0.13 0.13 -0.19 -0.01 0.00 0.11 0.00 -0.01 1.00 
(26) ∆WC -0.02 -0.04 0.03 -0.03 -0.04 0.11 0.05 0.00 0.05 0.18 0.01 1.00 
(27) ∆NCO -0.05 -0.05 0.08 0.01 -0.06 0.18 0.06 0.00 0.06 0.30 0.03 0.14 1.00 
(28) ∆FIN 0.01 0.01 -0.03 -0.02 0.02 -0.08 -0.04 0.01 -0.18 -0.15 -0.02 -0.34 -0.56 1.00 
This table provides the descriptive statistics (Panel A) and Pearson correlations (Panel B) of the main variables used in this study. Correlation is significant at 1% 
(two-tailed) if the correlation coefficient is greater than 0.01. The detailed definitions of the variables are provided in the Appendix. All continuous variables are 
trimmed at the 1 and 99 percentiles.  
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TABLE 3 
Relation between Auditor Quality and Tax Aggressiveness 
  (1) (2) (3) 
BIGN -0.533 -0.363 -0.274 
(-11.49)*** (-7.64)*** (-6.03)*** 
TAXRATE 1.990 
(4.74)*** 
WW -0.271 
(-5.36)*** 
BTAXC -0.248 
(-2.92)*** 
TAXENF -0.118 
(-2.93)*** 
PCTEQ 0.211 
(0.77) 
EARNVOL 0.301 
(3.43)*** 
LGDP 0.071 
(2.34)** 
TREND -0.022 
(-2.79)*** 
PROA -0.025 -0.024 
(-2.26)** (-2.16)** 
SIZE -0.118 -0.119 
(-8.41)*** (-8.62)*** 
R&D -0.747 -1.004 
(-1.05) (-1.44) 
LEV 0.851 0.813 
(6.69)*** (6.42)*** 
GROWTH 0.031 0.032 
(3.34)*** (3.41)*** 
MULTI -0.645 -0.537 
(-9.23)*** (-8.31)*** 
∆WC 0.586 0.613 
(4.26)*** (4.46)*** 
∆NCO 1.048 1.080 
(9.23)*** (9.50)*** 
∆FIN 0.986 1.000 
(7.95)*** (7.99)*** 
Constant -0.919 -0.570 -2.642 
(-4.35)*** (-2.62)*** (-7.25)*** 
N 41,958 41,958 41,958 
Pseudo R-sq 0.0176 0.0378 0.0388 
This table reports the regression results of the relation between auditor quality and tax aggressiveness. The dependent 
variable is tax aggressiveness (TAXAGGR), which is an indicator equals one if the tax avoidance is within the top quintile 
in each country-industry combination, and zero otherwise. Column 1 shows the results excluding control variables; 
Column 2 shows the results including control variables, but without country-level tax system controls; and Column 3 
shows the results including additional controls for country-level tax system. The regressions in Column 1 and 2 include 
year, industry, and country fixed effects, while the regression in Column 3 includes year and industry fixed effects. The 
detailed definitions of all variables are provided in the Appendix. Coefficients on the year, industry and country indicator 
variables are not tabulated for brevity. The z-statistics reported in parentheses are based on standard errors clustered by 
firm to control for cross-sectional dependence in the data. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels, respectively. 
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TABLE 4 
Relation between Auditor Quality and Tax Aggressiveness: The Role of Investor Protection 
  (1) (2) (3) 
IP=COMMON IP=LAWE IP=ANTIDEAL 
BIGN -0.139 -0.273 -0.307 
(-2.57)** (-6.01)*** (-6.69)*** 
BIGN_IP -0.356 -0.091 -0.753 
(-4.34)*** (-3.92)*** (-5.18)*** 
IP -0.345 -0.062 -0.834 
(-4.12)*** (-1.71)* (-5.32)*** 
TAXRATE 2.169 1.924 2.420 
(5.06)*** (4.61)*** (5.41)*** 
WW -0.226 -0.273 -0.184 
 (-4.30)*** (-5.26)*** (-3.37)*** 
BTAXC -0.243 -0.222 -0.221 
 (-2.85)*** (-2.61)*** (-2.63)*** 
TAXENF -0.086 -0.109 -0.087 
 (-1.99)** (-2.53)** (-2.09)** 
PCTEQ 0.629 0.217 0.811 
 (1.95)* (0.78) (2.59)*** 
EARNVOL 0.336 0.320 0.367 
 (3.94)*** (3.68)*** (4.38)*** 
LGDP 0.089 0.025 0.072 
 (2.90)*** (0.53) (2.36)** 
TREND -0.025 -0.023 -0.026 
 (-3.20)*** (-2.86)*** (-3.34)*** 
PROA -0.023 -0.024 -0.022 
(-2.11)** (-2.20)** (-2.04)** 
SIZE -0.116 -0.119 -0.113 
(-8.41)*** (-8.58)*** (-8.06)*** 
R&D -0.915 -0.985 -0.852 
(-1.30) (-1.40) (-1.21) 
LEV 0.820 0.822 0.825 
(6.45)*** (6.48)*** (6.49)*** 
GROWTH 0.031 0.032 0.030 
(3.46)*** (3.45)*** (3.30)*** 
MULTI -0.518 -0.526 -0.532 
(-7.76)*** (-8.11)*** (-7.87)*** 
∆WC 0.604 0.605 0.602 
(4.41)*** (4.40)*** (4.41)*** 
∆NCO 1.057 1.068 1.072 
(9.37)*** (9.42)*** (9.49)*** 
∆FIN 0.979 0.982 0.989 
(7.85)*** (7.86)*** (7.94)*** 
Constant -2.828 -2.115 -2.584 
(-7.73)*** (-3.69)*** (-7.08)*** 
N 41,958 41,958 41,958 
Pseudo R-sq 0.0403 0.0394 0.0410 
This table reports the regression results of the role investor protection (IP) on the relation between auditor quality (BIGN) 
and tax aggressiveness (TAXAGGR). TAXAGGR is an indicator equals one if the tax avoidance is within the top quintile in 
each country-industry combination, and zero otherwise. IP is proxied by COMMON in Column 1, by LAWE in Column 2, 
and ANTIDEAL in Column 3. The detailed definitions of all variables are provided in the Appendix. Coefficients on the 
year and industry indicator variables are not tabulated for brevity. The z-statistics reported in parentheses are based on 
standard errors clustered by firm to control for cross-sectional dependence in the data. ***, **, and * denote significance 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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TABLE 5 
Relation between Auditor Quality and Tax Aggressiveness:  
The Role of Auditor Litigation and the Audit Environment 
  (1) (2) (3) 
AUDIT=BURDEN AUDIT=LITIG AUDIT=AUDENV
BIGN -0.296 -0.290 -0.284 
(-6.46)*** (-6.31)*** (-6.17)*** 
BIGN_AUDIT -0.387 -0.070 -0.066 
(-2.36)** (-4.27)*** (-6.19)*** 
AUDIT -0.823 -0.051 -0.055 
(-5.79)*** (-2.63)*** (-4.80)*** 
TAXRATE 3.460 1.915 1.928 
(6.52)*** (4.54)*** (4.60)*** 
WW -0.202 -0.243 -0.235 
 (-3.81)*** (-4.50)*** (-4.57)*** 
BTAXC -0.261 -0.223 -0.216 
 (-3.08)*** (-2.59)*** (-2.50)** 
TAXENF -0.168 -0.106 -0.089 
 (-4.05)*** (-2.55)** (-2.16)** 
PCTEQ 1.081 0.381 0.380 
 (3.39)*** (1.14) (1.33) 
EARNVOL 0.300 0.338 0.330 
 (3.47)*** (3.85)*** (3.83)*** 
LGDP 0.104 0.028 -0.005 
 (3.38)*** (0.79) (-0.13) 
TREND -0.018 -0.025 -0.024 
 (-2.19)** (-3.16)*** (-3.05)*** 
PROA -0.022 -0.023 -0.024 
(-2.04)** (-2.14)** (-2.23)** 
SIZE -0.114 -0.115 -0.118 
(-8.23)*** (-8.31)*** (-8.60)*** 
R&D -1.067 -1.008 -0.911 
(-1.50) (-1.41) (-1.30) 
LEV 0.806 0.835 0.835 
(6.36)*** (6.57)*** (6.57)*** 
GROWTH 0.031 0.031 0.031 
(3.38)*** (3.43)*** (3.48)*** 
MULTI -0.538 -0.509 -0.506 
(-8.20)*** (-7.61)*** (-7.65)*** 
∆WC 0.599 0.606 0.611 
(4.39)*** (4.42)*** (4.44)*** 
∆NCO 1.083 1.063 1.062 
(9.60)*** (9.39)*** (9.38)*** 
∆FIN 1.004 0.984 0.974 
(8.05)*** (7.88)*** (7.79)*** 
Constant -3.545 -2.116 -1.688 
(-8.78)*** (-4.73)*** (-3.78)*** 
N 41,958 41,821 41,958 
Pseudo R-sq 0.0407 0.0400 0.0408 
This table reports the regression results of the role auditor litigation risk and audit environment (AUDIT) on the relation 
between auditor quality (BIGN) and tax aggressiveness (TAXAGGR). TAXAGGR is an indicator equals one if the tax 
avoidance is within the top quintile in each country-industry combination, and zero otherwise. AUDIT is proxied by 
BURDEN in Column 1, by LITIG in Column 2, and AUDENV in Column 3. The detailed definitions of all variables are 
provided in the Appendix. Coefficients on the year and industry indicator variables are not tabulated for brevity. The z-
statistics reported in parentheses are based on standard errors clustered by firm to control for cross-sectional dependence 
in the data. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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TABLE 6 
Relation between Auditor Quality and Tax Aggressiveness: The Role of Capital Market Pressure 
 (1) (2) (3) 
MARKET=EQTY MARKET=STMCAP MARKET=DEV
BIGN -0.310 -0.306 -0.273 
(-6.44)*** (-6.59)*** (-5.99)*** 
BIGN_MARKET -0.021 -0.003 -0.367 
(-4.08)*** (-4.45)*** (-3.63)*** 
MARKET 0.045 0.002 0.434 
(6.59)*** (5.04)*** (3.35)*** 
TAXRATE 4.161 2.391 1.794 
(7.10)*** (5.24)*** (4.21)*** 
WW -0.166 -0.241 -0.312 
 (-2.97)*** (-4.64)*** (-5.64)*** 
BTAXC -0.315 -0.216 -0.243 
 (-3.46)*** (-2.48)** (-2.83)*** 
TAXENF -0.037 -0.112 -0.088 
 (-0.81) (-2.74)*** (-2.13)** 
PCTEQ 1.119 0.292 0.118 
 (3.22)*** (1.07) (0.43) 
EARNVOL 0.297 0.318 0.348 
 (3.26)*** (3.55)*** (3.97)*** 
LGDP 0.039 0.050 -0.012 
 (1.27) (1.63) (-0.28) 
TREND -0.013 -0.026 -0.021 
 (-1.57) (-3.23)*** (-2.71)*** 
PROA -0.023 -0.019 -0.025 
(-2.00)** (-1.70)* (-2.24)** 
SIZE -0.119 -0.122 -0.118 
(-8.33)*** (-8.76)*** (-8.56)*** 
R&D -0.964 -0.888 -0.963 
(-1.33) (-1.26) (-1.38) 
LEV 0.905 0.843 0.824 
(6.91)*** (6.62)*** (6.50)*** 
GROWTH 0.034 0.029 0.032 
(3.59)*** (3.06)*** (3.53)*** 
MULTI -0.526 -0.523 -0.539 
(-7.86)*** (-7.88)*** (-8.28)*** 
∆WC 0.530 0.608 0.604 
(3.81)*** (4.43)*** (4.39)*** 
∆NCO 1.057 1.093 1.067 
(9.07)*** (9.56)*** (9.39)*** 
∆FIN 0.976 1.019 0.986 
(7.63)*** (8.10)*** (7.88)*** 
Constant -2.623 -2.477 -1.684 
(-6.82)*** (-6.67)*** (-3.39)*** 
N 39,857 41,169 41,958 
Pseudo R-sq 0.0451 0.0411 0.0394 
This table reports the regression results of the role capital market pressure (MARKET) on the relation between auditor 
quality (BIGN) and tax aggressiveness (TAXAGGR). TAXAGGR is an indicator equals one if the tax avoidance is within 
the top quintile in each country-industry combination, and zero otherwise. MARKET is proxied by EQTY in Column 1, by 
STMCAP in Column 2, and DEV in Column 3. The detailed definitions of all variables are provided in the Appendix. 
Coefficients on the year and industry indicator variables are not tabulated for brevity. The z-statistics reported in 
parentheses are based on standard errors clustered by firm to control for cross-sectional dependence in the data. ***, **, 
and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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TABLE 7 
Relation between Auditor Quality and Tax Aggressiveness: Alternate Measures for Tax Aggressiveness 
  
Dependent variable: 
TAXAVOID 
Dependent variable: 
ADJ_TAXGGR 
BIGN -0.040 -0.029 
(-10.01)*** (-7.97)*** 
TAXRATE 0.536 0.182 
(14.70)*** (5.41)*** 
WW -0.003 -0.026 
 (-0.74) (-6.87)*** 
BTAXC -0.001 -0.029 
 (-0.14) (-4.35)*** 
TAXENF -0.004 -0.011 
 (-1.11) (-3.65)*** 
PCTEQ 0.175 0.032 
 (7.59)*** (1.52) 
EARNVOL 0.014 0.017 
 (1.92)* (2.46)** 
LGDP 0.009 0.005 
 (3.49)*** (2.06)** 
TREND -0.001 -0.001 
 (-2.20)** (-0.95) 
PROA -0.001 -0.000 
(-0.56) (-0.14) 
SIZE -0.005 -0.004 
(-4.28)*** (-3.94)*** 
R&D -0.134 -0.070 
(-2.12)** (-1.20) 
LEV 0.026 0.019 
(2.43)** (1.98)** 
GROWTH 0.001 0.000 
(0.48) (0.36) 
MULTI -0.060 -0.039 
(-12.71)*** (-9.22)*** 
∆WC 0.084 0.083 
(7.14)*** (7.27)*** 
∆NCO 0.124 0.107 
(14.94)*** (13.55)*** 
∆FIN 0.079 0.066 
 (8.72)*** (7.47)*** 
Constant 0.048 -0.111 
(1.58) (-3.99)*** 
N 41,958 41,958 
R-sq 0.133 0.055 
This table reports the regression results of the relation between auditor quality (BIGN) and alternative proxies for tax 
aggressiveness. In Column 1, the dependent variable is continuous variable, TAXAVOID. In Column 2, the dependent 
variable is ADJ_TAXAGGR, the country-industry mean-adjusted measure of tax aggressiveness, computed as the firm-
year specific TAXAVOID minus the mean TAXAVOID in each country-industry combination. The detailed definitions of 
all variables are provided in the Appendix. Coefficients on the year and industry indicator variables are not tabulated for 
brevity. The t-statistics reported in parentheses are based on standard errors clustered by firm to control for cross-sectional 
dependence in the data. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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TABLE 8 
Relation between Auditor Quality and Tax Aggressiveness: Alternate Proxies for Auditor Quality  
 
  (1) (2) 
AUDSPEC=SPEC1 AUDSPEC=SPEC2 
AUDSPEC -0.505 -0.369 
(-2.93)*** (-2.02)** 
TAXRATE 2.643 2.579 
(2.38)** (2.31)** 
WW 0.001 0.001 
 (0.01) (0.00) 
BTAXC -0.341 -0.340 
 (-1.39) (-1.39) 
TAXENF -0.160 -0.162 
 (-1.24) (-1.25) 
PCTEQ 0.169 0.255 
 (0.16) (0.24) 
EARNVOL 0.367 0.349 
 (1.43) (1.37) 
LGDP -0.126 -0.085 
 (-1.15) (-0.80) 
TREND 0.000 -0.017 
 (0.01) (-0.57) 
PROA -0.023 -0.021 
(-0.62) (-0.56) 
SIZE -0.119 -0.122 
(-3.76)*** (-3.87)*** 
R&D -0.054 -0.101 
(-0.04) (-0.07) 
LEV 1.121 1.121 
(3.24)*** (3.24)*** 
GROWTH 0.051 0.050 
(1.75)* (1.73)* 
MULTI -0.575 -0.569 
(-4.59)*** (-4.55)*** 
∆WC 0.618 0.629 
(1.64) (1.66)* 
∆NCO 1.296 1.288 
(4.15)*** (4.13)*** 
∆FIN 1.134 1.127 
(3.21)*** (3.19)*** 
Constant -1.340 -1.701 
(-1.25) (-1.61) 
N 9,530 9,530 
Pseudo R-sq 0.0474 0.0465 
This table reports the regression results of the relation between auditor quality and tax aggressiveness (TAXAGGR), using 
alternative proxies for auditor quality. The sample is restricted to firms audited by Big N auditors. In Column 1, SPEC1 is 
an indicator that equals one if the auditor has the largest industry market share in the respective country-industry 
combination, and zero otherwise. In Column 2, SPEC2 is an indicator that equals one if the industry market share of the 
auditor is more than 20 percent for the period prior to 1998, 24 percent for the period 1998 to 2001, and 30 percent for the 
period after 2002 (Neal and Riley 2004), and zero otherwise.  The detailed definitions of all variables are provided in the 
Appendix. Coefficients on the year and industry indicator variables are not tabulated for brevity. The z-statistics reported 
in parentheses are based on standard errors clustered by firm to control for cross-sectional dependence in the data. ***, 
**, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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TABLE 9 
Relation between Auditor Switches and Change in Tax Aggressiveness 
 
 No. of  
Switches 
Median 
∆TAXAVOID 
p-value based  
on sign tests 
Non-Big N to Big N 1,518 -0.85% p=0.00 
    
Big N to non-Big N 3,600 1.00% p=0.00 
    
All auditor switches 5,118 0.28% p=0.00 
 
This table reports the results examining the relation between auditor switches and change in tax avoidance. ∆TAXAVOID 
measures the change in tax avoidance from year t-1 to year t.  The table reports the median ∆TAXAVOID for firms that 
switch from a Non-Big N to a Big N auditor, and from a Big N to a non-Big N auditor. The last column depicts two-tailed 
p-values based on non-parametric sign-tests of whether ∆TAXAVOID differs from zero.  
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TABLE 10 
Relation between Auditor Quality and Tax Aggressiveness in the Pre- and Post-2002 Period  
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Pre-2002 Post-2002 All 
        
BIGN -0.129 -0.469 -0.186 
(-2.15)** (-7.19)*** (-3.25)*** 
BIGN_POST -0.439 
(-5.75)*** 
POST 0.606 
(8.21)*** 
TAXRATE 2.218 0.579 2.014 
(4.38)*** (0.90) (4.85)*** 
WW -0.047 -0.553 -0.276 
 (-0.62) (-8.67)*** (-5.50)*** 
BTAXC -0.102 -0.125 -0.270 
 (-0.88) (-1.03) (-3.24)*** 
TAXENF -0.070 -0.117 -0.129 
 (-1.15) (-2.17)** (-3.22)*** 
PCTEQ 0.459 0.480 0.285 
 (1.03) (1.49) (1.04) 
EARNVOL 0.335 0.310 0.311 
(2.99)*** (2.53)** (3.57)*** 
LGDP 0.069 0.226 0.077 
 (1.78)* (5.41)*** (2.58)*** 
TREND -0.069 0.037 -0.051 
 (-5.67)*** (1.84)* (-5.11)*** 
PROA -0.011 -0.059 -0.023 
(-1.00) (-2.05)** (-2.14)** 
SIZE -0.106 -0.134 -0.111 
(-5.06)*** (-8.74)*** (-8.15)*** 
R&D -1.562 -0.770 -1.120 
(-1.35) (-0.91) (-1.60) 
LEV 0.972 0.612 0.771 
(5.26)*** (3.93)*** (6.14)*** 
GROWTH 0.018 0.063 0.031 
(1.92)* (2.40)** (3.36)*** 
MULTI -0.581 -0.415 -0.549 
(-6.00)*** (-5.38)*** (-8.53)*** 
∆WC 0.806 0.399 0.622 
(4.19)*** (1.91)* (4.52)*** 
∆NCO 1.141 1.010 1.109 
(7.26)*** (5.94)*** (9.86)*** 
∆FIN 1.143 0.790 0.986 
(6.60)*** (4.40)*** (7.85)*** 
Constant -0.955 -4.374 -2.871 
(-1.99)** (-8.37)*** (-8.08)*** 
N 22,902 19,056 41,958 
Pseudo R-sq 0.0389 0.0521 0.0349 
This table reports the regression results of the relation between auditor quality (BIGN) and tax aggressiveness (TAXAGGR) between the 
pre- and post-2002 period. Columns 1 and 2 show the results for the pre- and post-2002 period, respectively. Column 3 shows results 
for the full sample with a variable POST, coded one for post-2002 period, and zero otherwise, and an interaction term BIGN*POST. 
The detailed definitions of all variables are provided in the Appendix. Coefficients on the year and industry indicator variables are not 
tabulated for brevity. The z-statistics reported in parentheses are based on standard errors clustered by firm to control for cross-sectional 
dependence in the data. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
